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Introduction:  
 
Detective Greggs: Fighting the war on drugs… one brutality case at a time 
Detective Carver: Girl, you can’t even think of calling this s*** a war 
Detective Hauk: Why not? 
Detective Carver: War’s end 
-- The Wire: Season 1, Episode 1 
 
Like millions of American children, Michael Botticelli grew up in a family with a long 
history of addiction. By early adulthood, Michael too had become an addict. After being arrested 
for driving under the influence, a lenient judge gave him the option of entering treatment or 
going to prison.1 Like many addicts would if given the chance, Michael opted for treatment and 
has maintained sobriety ever since. After completing the rehabilitation program, he built a career 
for himself in the Massachusetts Department of Health and worked tirelessly to improve 
treatment options for those afflicted with substance use disorders. His efforts recently became 
recognized on a national scale, and in 2014 he was selected to be the Director of the White 
House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy under President Obama. He is the first person in 
substance abuse recovery to hold the position. 
Michael’s success story is all too rare. Currently, only 12% of Americans suffering from 
addiction are receiving treatment of any kind.2 Generally, this is because it is widely unavailable,  
not because the addicts do not want treatment. This phenomenon is particularly troubling in the 
face of the current American opioid epidemic, which is becoming increasingly problematic every 
day. Compared to the rest of the world, the United States is experiencing rapidly climbing rates 
                                                        
1 Alan Schwartz, “Michael Botticelli is a Drug Czar Who Knows Addiction Firsthand,” The New York Times, April 
25, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/us/michael-botticelli-is-a-drug-czar-who-knows-addiction-
firsthand.html?_r=1. 
2 Lloyd Sederer, “A Blind Eye to Addiction: Drug and Alcohol Addicts in the U.S. Aren’t Getting the 
Comprehensive Treatment They Deserve,” U.S. News, June 1, 2015, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/policy-
dose/2015/06/01/america-is-neglecting-its-addiction-problem. 
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of drug overdoses and overdose fatalities, evidenced by the fact that although the United States 
only accounts for 5% of the world’s population, it is now responsible for over 25% of the 
world’s overdoses.3 In 2016 alone, there were over 64,000 recorded drug overdose deaths in the 
United States, the highest rate ever recorded, of which half were attributable to opioid-related 
substances.4 In a stunning, unprecedented moment in American history, drug overdoses are now 
the leading cause of American injury death, above both car crashes and gun incidents.  
Unlike other previous drug epidemics, what makes the opioid epidemic especially unique 
is not only the unparalleled nature of the issue, but also the policy approaches being put forward 
that are attempting to combat it. For the past fifty years, American drug policy has been 
manipulated and enforced in a way that has made it possible for drug epidemics to occur and has 
exaggerated their negative consequences on society. Put simply, prior to the 1970s, widespread 
drug enforcement was basically non-existent. However, the War on Drugs policy initiatives first 
implemented in 1970 created a national drug law enforcement structure that mainly consisted of 
criminal justice-based policies, such as extremely punitive drug laws, as a method to reduce the 
supply of illegal drugs. There is now a broad consensus among scholars, policymakers, and the 
general public that not only has the War on Drugs failed to diminish the supply of illicit drugs to 
any significant degree, but also that it has criminalized addiction. As the severity and intensity of 
the opioid epidemic continues to grow, many are replacing drug war era policies with alternative 
strategies. 
                                                        
3 Sederer, “A Blind Eye to Addiction: Drug and Alcohol Addicts in the U.S. Aren’t Getting the Comprehensive 
Treatment They Deserve.” 
4 German Lopez, “How Obama Quietly Reshaped America’s War on Drugs,” Vox, January 19, 2017, 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/12/19/13903532/obama-war-on-drugs-legacy. 
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This thesis seeks to evaluate why the War on Drugs policies failed and trace the 
astonishing trajectory of the opioid epidemic in order to recommend realistic, effective, and 
innovative policy solutions that can be successful in curbing the crisis. As a way to comprehend 
and categorize the vast array of possible solutions, I use the basic economic theory of supply and 
demand. In terms of addressing a drug epidemic, supply-side policies include any policies that 
look to diminish the supply of drugs through criminal justice-based, law enforcement strategies 
like incarceration, interdiction, and production control. Demand-side policies constitute any 
strategies that attempt to diminish the demand for illicit drugs, the demand referring to the 
addicted users themselves. As Chapter One will discuss, the War on Drugs is now perceived as a 
failure because strictly supply-side policies were implemented, which did not take the demand of 
the addicted users into account. Chapters Two and Three will provide a brief history about how 
the War on Drugs policies have proliferated into the opioid epidemic, and how the first 
prescription opioid wave of the epidemic directly led to the more recent heroin and fentanyl 
wave of the crisis. Chapter Four provides specific examples of successful policy solutions that 
have been implemented on the state and local levels of government. Lastly, and most 
importantly, Chapter Five aims to fill one of the gaps I perceive to be in the available literature 
on drug policy and epidemics.  
While the supply and demand framework is useful, a broad recognition that the War on 
Drugs era increased state and local involvement in drug enforcement in terms of both supply-side 
and demand-side initiatives, despite drug policy being a federally mandated policy, is missing 
from the literature. This “federalization of drug policy” suggests that when one is contemplating 
policy solutions, both the two different types of policy approaches and the level of government 
that is best suited for particular policies, must be taken into consideration. Thus, this thesis 
Librett 4 
 
attempts to apply a two-layered framework of supply and demand within the scope of federalism 
in order to answer that complicated question. 
The efforts to eliminate the supply of drugs, drug consumption, and addiction from the 
United States have failed. As I will argue, there are a set of reasonable, justifiable, and possible 
policy solutions that have worked, and can work in every region of the country that has been 
disproportionately affected by this crisis. Hopefully, by providing a new framework, this thesis 
can offer some innovative insights about how the United States can approach this ongoing issue.  
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Chapter I: Applying a “Supply and Demand” Model for the War on Drugs Policies 1970-
2000 
 
“You want to know what [the war on drugs] was really all about, The Nixon campaign in 1968, 
and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. We 
knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to 
associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, 
we could disrupt those communities. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we 
did.” – John Ehrlichman, White House Domestic Affairs Advisor 1969-1973 
 
I. Introduction 
The United States has been fighting the so-called “War on Drugs” for the past fifty years, 
beginning with the declaration of drugs as “America’s public enemy number one” by the Nixon 
administration in 1971.5 Despite a decades-long battle against drug misuse and abuse, there are 
now more drugs, with higher potencies, at cheaper prices, available now than before these initial 
policies were implemented. This paradoxical phenomenon has led scholars, experts, and policy 
makers to attempt to understand the causes and create possible solutions of drug epidemics 
through the use of theories and perspectives drawn from various disciplines. Although there are 
many prisms one can use to evaluate drug policy, one of the most popular methods used to study 
the effectiveness of complex and wide-ranging drug policies is the basic economic paradigm of 
supply and demand. Through this model, scholars have been able to historically analyze various 
failed American drug policies, creating the workable and inclusive theoretical framework needed 
to craft, categorize, and understand the sweeping drug policy solutions made since the beginning 
of the drug war. It is crucial, then, to explore this economically based perspective through a 
historical narrative of the War on Drugs policies in order to comprehend how the federal 
government implemented a draconian, supply-side drug policy that subsequently incentivized 
and shaped attitudes towards illegal drugs on the state level. The similarities and coordination 
                                                        
5 Dora M. Dumont, et al., “Public Health and the Epidemic of Incarceration,” Annual Review of Public Health 33, 
(April 21 2012): 327, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3329888/. 
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between the national and state drug policies, first molded by the policies set on the federal level 
and the adopted on the state levels, has to be understood before considering possible solutions for 
the current opioid epidemic that has been perpetuated by both of these levels of drug policy.  
 
II. Supply and Demand Theoretical Model for Drug Policy 
In this model, the “supply-side” refers to the enforcement, distribution, source-country 
interdiction, and production controls of drugs, while the “demand-side” refers to the treatment, 
education, and prevention programs put in place to reduce the number of drug users.6 In other 
words, “supply-side” policies represent the criminal justice-based, law enforcement-focused 
approaches used to minimize the amount of drugs available, while “demand-side” policies 
represent a public health approach grounded in treatment that aims to diminish the demand of 
drugs by decreasing the number of people who use them. The ideological differences between 
supply-side and demand-side strategies have formed the main crux of the debate regarding which 
policies will successfully reduce illegal drug use in the United States if implemented. 
Normal economic theory would predict that effective enforcement of illegal drugs (a 
solely supply-side policy) should directly reduce demand because diminishing the supply would 
simultaneously raise the price and minimize the availability of illicit drugs. Consequently, 
consumption would decrease due to drugs becoming more expensive and harder to procure.7 
However, in this case consumption cannot be directly linked to demand because unlike other 
products that can be explained using a supply and demand model, illegal drugs are 
                                                        
6 Peter Reuter, “Setting Priorities: Budget and Program Choices for Drug Control,” University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 1994, no. 1 (N.d.): 145, http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1158& 
context=uclf.  
7 United States White House, Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, National 
Drug Control Strategy for 1989, National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 1989, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/119466.pdf. 
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psychologically and physically addictive. Therefore, even if a supply-side strategy was 
successful in making illegal drugs more expensive and increasingly difficult to acquire by 
reducing the supply in the market, there will still be a finite number of addict consumers who 
will be willing to go to further lengths to get their fix.  
Subsequently, a decrease in consumption resulting from higher prices rather than lower 
demand merely shifts the point on the demand curve at which supply equals consumption. 
Therefore, a reduction in the supply is actually more likely to increase the profits for drug 
dealers, making the demand for drugs “inelastic.”8 In other words, the addictive nature of drugs 
means that the demand will not shift significantly even when the supply becomes smaller and 
more expensive. Therefore, drug dealers can then sell the supply they do have at higher prices, 
giving them the opportunity to turn a bigger profit. This phenomenon likely worsens the issue of 
drug use and addiction rather than mitigate it because higher revenues fiscally incentive more 
people to become involved in the drug trade.9 On the other hand, it can be assumed that an actual 
reduction in demand, potentially achieved through demand-side base policies that focus on 
rehabilitation, treatment, and prevention for drug addicts, could decrease consumption without 
generating negative side effects. However, because mainly supply-side strategies, such as 
increased law enforcement, mass incarceration, and interdiction, have been implemented over the 
past few decades, the demand for drugs has remained constant despite the enormous financial 
commitment to fighting the War on Drugs.  
Federal drug prohibition policies began in 1914 with the Harrison Act; however, it was 
not until the 1990s that researchers began to separate them into either supply-side or demand-
                                                        
8 Reuter, “Setting Priorities,” 155. 
9 Ibid. 
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side responses in order to analyze their overall effectiveness in counteracting drug epidemics.10 
One of the most prominent scholars associated with the supply and demand drug policy model is 
Peter Reuter, whose seminal writings in the early 1990s and 2000s have served as the 
foundational cornerstone of research pertaining to the economic-based perspective of drug 
epidemics and their subsequent policy responses. As an economist, he combines the economic 
theory of supply and demand with research on alternative approaches to drug control and federal 
and state responses to epidemics. At the time of his research, the dominant political strategy of 
the federal government was focused on supply-side solutions, and Reuter was one of the first 
scholars to question their efficacy, contending that the policies were “punitive (in both rhetoric 
and reality), divisive (certainly by race, and probably by age), intrusive (in small ways for many 
and in large ways for some), expensive (30 to 35 billion annually),” and most importantly, 
unsuccessful.11 Reuter’s critique of supply-side based policies has been adopted by the majority 
of drug policy scholars, as it recognizes that due to the addictive nature of drugs, the illegal drug 
market does not fit within the normal supply and demand framework.  
Later, other scholars who then used this approach expanded on this initial research to 
strongly criticize the federal government’s drug control budget, which year by year became more 
heavily weighted towards supply-side programs. For example, federal expenditures on drug 
control grew five-fold between 1980-1992, with 65% of the budget allocated towards 
enforcement programs, while only 25-35% was allocated towards preventing drug use and 
treating drug abuse or dependency.12 Nevertheless, between 1980-1985, Colombian traffickers, 
                                                        
10 Sam Quionones, Dreamland: The True Tale of America’s Opioid Epidemic (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2015), 
preface. 
11 Peter Reuter, “Limits of Supply-Side Drug Control,” RAND Corporation, 2001, http://faculty.publicpolicy.umd. 
edu/sites/default/files/reuter/files/milken.pdf. 
12 Reuter, “Setting Priorities,” 146.  
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the main source of heroin and cocaine in the United States at the time, doubled their profits from 
roughly $1.5 to $3 billion.13 These statistics suggest that while the spending on supply-side 
strategies drastically increased, the results were mediocre at best in curbing the flow of illicit 
drugs into the United States. 
Subsequently, the reluctance of the federal government to allocate adequate resources to 
treatment and prevention-based programs has been widely cited as one of the main reasons for 
the failure of the drug war. However, the incentives, programs, and overall supportive attitude 
for supply-side policies instituted by the federal government subsequently tricked down to the 
state and local levels. Thus, it is also important to note the role of state and local governments 
that engaged in these types of supply-side based solutions. Combined, state and local 
governments spend almost as much on drug control annually as does the federal government, and 
their budget allocations are even more heavily skewed towards enforcement. A study conducted 
by the U.S. Census Bureau found that state and local governments spent a total of $12.7 billion 
on drug control, as compared to the $11 billion spent by the federal government in 1993.14 These 
numbers indicate that state and local governments are at least equally responsible for the 
negative consequences associated with implementing mainly enforcement-based strategies. 
Therefore, the role of states must be considered when contemplating policy solutions for drug-
related crises.   
Overall, there is now a broad consensus among scholars and policymakers that supply-
side policy solutions are ineffective on their own. This shift in approach is reflected in the fact 
that most of the literature and policy recommendations that have been published in the 21st 
                                                        
13 Steven Hyland, “The Shifting Terrain of Latin Americana Drug Trafficking,” Origins: Current Events in 
Historical Perspective, September 2011, http://origins.osu.edu/article/shifting-terrain-latin-american-drug-
trafficking/page/0/1. 
14 Reuter, Setting Priorities,” 152. 
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century have favored demand-side policies. There has also been a change in public support for 
policies based around treatment, rehabilitation, and prevention. Americans witnessed the failure 
of the War on Drugs firsthand, and public opinion is important to take into consideration because 
politicians seeking re-election will in part tailor their policy strategies to their constituents’ 
demands.15 Moreover, so far over a trillion dollars of U.S. taxpayers money has been spent on 
these unsuccessful policies.16 The cost ineffectiveness of supply-side programs coupled with the 
fact that they have failed to completely eradicate the source of the drug market has been crucial 
in this transformation in support for supply-side and demand-side solutions. 
Because this theory divides drug policies into either “supply-side or “demand-side”, it is 
common to conceptualize these two types of policies as two separate entities that do not have an 
effect on each other. However, supply disruptions can play a major role in the subsequent 
demand for a certain drug. For example, the reformulation of OxyContin, one of the most 
commonly abused prescription opioids, into an “abuse-deterrent” form, led directly to a rise in 
heroin and fentanyl overdoses and overdose deaths. The overprescribing of prescription opioids 
is widely believed to be the main driver of the current opioid epidemic, and OxyContin was 
reformulated in 2010 in a way that made it more difficult to crush the pills, the way most addicts 
tend to abuse them.17 Although this strategy helped curb prescription abuse, it caused large 
national shock to the supply of prescription opioids as they were then “unabusable.” 
                                                        
15 Gregory J. Madden, “Ammunition for Fighting a Demand-Side War on Drugs: A Review of Contingency 
Management in Substance Abuse Treatment,” Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis 41, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 
abstract, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2606593/. 
16 Annabelle Buggle, “After 40-Year Fight, Illicit Drug Use at All Time High,” Huffington Post, December 6, 2017, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/annabelle-buggle/after-40year-fight-illici_b_3623714.html. 
17 Abby Alpert, David Powell, and Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, “Supply-Side Drug Policy in the  Presence of 
Substitutes: Evidence from the Introduction of Abuse-Deterrent Opioids,” American Economic Journal (January 
2017): 45, file:///Users/carilibrett/Downloads/RAND_WR1181.pdf. 
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Consequently, many addicts turned to heroin as a substitute.18 This phenomenon not only 
highlights the challenge of addressing a deep-rooted addiction epidemic in the presence of 
numerous substitutes, but more importantly demonstrates the intertwined connection between 
supply-side and demand-side policies. Although this supply-side policy was successful in 
reducing the overall amount of prescription opioids available to users, it increased the demand 
for other, more dangerous types of opioids. Supply-side and demand-side policies contain 
drastically different approaches on how to successfully mitigate drug epidemics. However, in 
order to understand why certain types of policies fail, it is necessary to realize how one type of 
policy can affect the other. Exclusively supply-side solutions have failed, but it is equally 
unlikely that demand-side approaches alone will be successful in countering drug epidemics. 
 
III. War on Drugs Policies 1970-2000 
Generally speaking, American drug policy, which has been historically focused on 
supply-side strategies, has not made any significant strides in minimizing the amount of illegal 
drugs available in the United States. The overall rate of current illicit drug use among persons 
aged twelve or older has risen steadily from 6.2 to 9.4 percent between 2000 and 201319, 
suggesting that these strategies have yet to produce any noteworthy changes in drug availability 
or perceived patterns of use.20 Most federal and state funding has been appropriated to 
intensified law enforcement strategies, unwarranted punitive policies, and interdiction and 
eradication efforts, which have failed and will continue to fail. While American drug policy dates 
                                                        
18 Daniel Ciccarone, “Fentanyl in the U.S. Heroin Supply: A Rapidly Changing Risk Environment,” International 
Journal of Drug Policy 46 (2017): 108, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28735776. 
19 United States Department of Health and Human Services. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of National Findings, 
SAMHSA: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2014, https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/ 
teddefault/files/NSDUHresultsPDFWHTML2013/Web/NSDUHresults2013.pdf. 
20 Leif Rosenberger, America’s Drug War Debacle (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 1996), 6.  
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back to the early 20th century, a full historical review goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Instead, I will focus mainly on policies starting in 1970 during Nixon’s presidency, as his 
administration marks the true beginning of the drug war. Through an evaluation of the failed 
supply-side based “War on Drugs” policies employed from 1970-2000, it will become clear as to 
why this type of approach is highly unsuccessful in curbing drug use, misuse, and above all 
epidemics, such as the current opioid crisis.  
 The War on Drugs involved the participation and coordination of the federal, state, and 
local governments, including various agencies tasked with drug enforcement, federal and state 
criminal justice systems, and a certain degree of citizen support. However, it was also necessary 
to have both a presidential administration and congressional support dedicated to employing 
supply-side policies in order for them to come to fruition. Four presidents have personally waged 
a “war on drugs,” beginning with Nixon, who declared drug abuse as “public enemy number 
one” in the United States at the time of his election.21 Although he made a “law and order” 
approach to crime a central part of his campaign, his call for a “war on drugs” proved to be 
largely rhetorical as his administration failed to propose dramatic shifts in drug policy. In fact, in 
June 1971, he addressed Congress and declared “as long as there is a demand [for drugs], there 
will be those willing to take the risks of meeting that demand,” publicly proclaiming that efforts 
of interdiction and eradication would likely be unsuccessful in deterring drug use.22 In reality, the 
drug war was only waged sporadically during the Nixon administration, and some of the only 
efforts solely focused on disrupting the heroin trade. Despite some antidrug legislation that was 
passed by Congress later that year, the Nixon years marked the only time in the War on Drugs 
                                                        
21 Rosenberger, 34. 
22 Rosenberger, 55. 
Librett 13 
 
when more funding went to treatment than law enforcement23, and declining drug use and crime 
rates soon followed.  
 Despite this temporary focus on treatment, Nixon did take some preliminary actions 
towards creating a more supply-side based drug policy that were expanded on in later 
administrations. Notwithstanding his efforts to initiate treatment programs, Nixon authorized the 
creation of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 1973, which consolidated narcotics agents and 
resources from various departments into a single federal entity that would be responsible for the 
enforcement of drug laws.24 Through the DEA, he launched a massive interdiction effort in 1973, 
Operation Intercept, which pressured Mexico to regulate its opium and marijuana growers 
through instituting increased surveillance at the Southwest America-Mexico border.25 Although 
this was initially successful in curtailing the supply from Mexico, Colombia was quick to replace 
Mexico as the United States’ main supplier. This failure of interdiction was the American 
government’s first lesson in the “iron law of drug economics,” which posits that as law 
enforcement becomes more intense, the potency of prohibited substances, in this case illegal 
drugs, increases.26 The Nixon administration was the first administration to misunderstand that 
the supply-side technique of interdiction would be bound to fail due to the reality of addiction: as 
long as a demand exists, there will be a supply provided. Although he failed to make any 
significant changes to drug policy during his presidency, Nixon’s use of a “law and order” 
approach and creation of the DEA would have lasting impacts on future policy implementation. 
                                                        
23 Rosenberger, 54. 
24 Ted Galen Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 15. 
25 Lawrence Gooberman, Operation Intercept: The Multiple Consequences of Public Policy (Elmsford, New York: 
Pergamon Press Inc., 1974), 4. 
26 Rosenberger, 23. 
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 Although Nixon’s successors, Ford and Carter, continued to proliferate perfunctory 
antidrug rhetoric, in general they “seemed even less committed to substantive action, especially 
on the substantive front.”27 Even with a large increase in cocaine and heroin use in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the Carter administration was equally as uncommitted to fighting the drug war 
as the Ford administration had been. In a speech to Congress, Carter declared that the “penalties 
against possession of a drug should not be more damaging to an individual than the use of the 
drug itself.”28 During this time period, eleven states decriminalized marijuana, and other 
jurisdictions substantially reduced penalties for drug offenders. Contrary to the rhetoric spread 
by drug prohibitionists, there were negligible effects on the general consumption in the eleven 
states that pursued the decriminalization process.29 This shift in public support and state action in 
building a more tolerant attitude towards drug use and the unwillingness of the Ford and Carter 
administrations to ramp up the drug war was intensely criticized by the “drug warriors,” 
politicians who supported prohibition. One of the most prominent “drug warriors” of the time 
and member of Carter’s White House Council on Drug Abuse Strategy, David Musto, admitted 
that despite rising rates of drug imports during this period, “we were supposed to establish a drug 
abuse policy for the federal government, and we did not do it. We requested meetings that were 
denied time and time again.”30 This tolerant attitude was short lived, however, and was soon to 
be completely eradicated in the coming Reagan administration. 
 President Reagan announced his own drug war in 1982, and despite originally conceding 
that fighting the supply-side of the drug war was a losing proposition, he soon adopted the 
“getting tough” and “law and order” approach to crime, especially drug crime, of his 
                                                        
27 Carpenter, 16. 
28 Rosenberger, 23. 
29 Carpenter, 294. 
30 Carpenter, 21. 
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predecessors. The Reagan administration’s enthusiasm for revitalizing the drug war was partly 
due to an upsurge in drug use that had taken place during the late 1970s, which can be attributed 
to the inefficient supply-side policies and lack of demand-based strategies initiated in the two 
prior decades. Reagan’s promises to be tougher on crime and enhance the federal government’s 
role in combatting it prompted crime to become a major theme throughout his campaign. 
However, this became an issue once he was elected because fighting street crime has 
traditionally been the responsibility of state and local law enforcement. Reagan found drug law 
enforcement to be the answer to this dilemma, and by 1981 the Justice Department announced its 
intention to “cut the half the number of specialists assigned to prosecute white collar criminals 
and shift attention to drug law enforcement.”31 At the time, less than 2% of Americans viewed 
drugs as the most pressing issue facing the country.32 Following his announcement of his 
personal War on Drugs, the budgets for federal law enforcement agencies soared higher than 
ever before in order to carry out supply-side policies, while agencies tasked with demand-side 
solutions such as treatment, prevention, and education plummeted. Between 1981 and 1991, the 
antidrug funding and allocations for the FBI, Department of Defense, and the DEA increased 
from $8 million to $95 million, $33 million to $1 billion, and $38 million to $181 million, 
respectively.33 During this same time period, the funding for the National Institute of Drug 
Abuse and the Department of Education’s antidrug funds were cut from $274 million to $57 
million, and $14 million to $3 million.34 Subsequently, Reagan’s administration mainly focused 
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on “getting tough” on drugs, culminating in the notorious “zero tolerance” program in which 
punitive measures against users were emphasized rather than treatment.  
  In 1985, the trafficking, use, and abuse of crack cocaine, a potent form of smoke-able 
cocaine, exploded in American cities. Subsequently, public and government hysteria about drugs 
reached record highs as a moral panic arose surrounding the link between drugs and crime, 
particularly in poor, urban, minority inner-city neighborhoods. With this publicity, Reagan easily 
pushed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 through Congress, which devoted $1.7 billion to fight 
the drug crisis, and introduced harsh punishments such as the death penalty for major traffickers, 
life in prison for some repeat offenders, far more severe federal penalties for possession, and 
mandatory minimum sentences for the distribution of crack cocaine.35 This Act was expanded 
upon in 1988, and added new “civil penalties” for drug offenders, such as granting public 
housing authorities the power to evict any tenant who allows drug-related criminal activity to 
occur on or near public housing premises, and eliminated many federal benefits, including 
student loans, for anyone convicted of a drug offense.36  
The unprecedented nature of these harsh, draconian penalties and this blatant violation of 
civil liberties extended beyond any traditional criminal punishments in American history and 
remains the legacy of the Reagan administration. As in other administrations, the drug warriors 
of the 1980s were oblivious to the fact that prohibitionist drug laws, not the mere existence of 
drugs, cause such problems. Furthermore, the Reagan administration also failed to realize that 
the criminalization of addiction and the introduction of these penalties would have increasingly 
problematic consequences on the American criminal justice and penal system. 
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Despite initially headlining innovative, demand-side based policies such as methadone 
clinics for addicts, President Clinton, a Democrat, escalated the drug war by continuing the 
Republican supply-side drug policy strategy. This shift in his drug policy strategy can be most 
attributed to political pressure from other Democrats who wanted to take control of the drug war 
away from the Republicans. He vowed that he would “never permit any Republican to be 
perceived as tougher on crime than he was,” and endorsed the idea of federal “three strikes and 
you’re out” laws, which require a person guilty of committing both a felony in addition to two 
other convictions to serve a mandatory life sentence in prison.37 He also authorized more than 
$16 billion for state prison grants and the expansion of state and local police forces to fight the 
drug war.38 More so than any other previous president in the War on Drugs, Clinton’s “tough on 
crime policies” resulted in the largest increases in federal and state inmates than under any other 
president in history.  
 Although individual presidential administrations were crucial in intensifying the War on 
Drugs, the bipartisan support among Congress during both Republican and Democratic 
administrations was ultimately responsible for actually instituting mainly supply-side policies.  
At worst, these politicians excitedly supported supply-side policies focused on draconian 
penalties and increased law enforcement strategies knowing that they were largely ineffective in 
curbing drug use, addiction, and trafficking. At best, they were complicit in these actions. For 
example, Clinton’s Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the largest crime 
bill in modern history, implemented provisions necessary for escalating the drug war by 
instituting the “three strikes” mandatory life sentence for repeat offenders, dedicated funding to 
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hire 100,000 more police officers and $9.7 billion for building more prisons, and expanded death 
penalty-eligible offenses.39 This bill passed both the House and Senate quickly, with a total of 95 
votes from the Senate in favor of passing it, including 53 Democrats and 42 Republicans.40 
Furthermore, the Republican 104th U.S. Congress killed many of Clinton’s early attempts to 
spend more on demand-side policies that would have shifted more funding to prevention and 
rehabilitation. However, this was not due to political polarization, considering that the 
Democratic 103rd Congress of the early 1990s also fought shifting drug policy towards demand-
side bases policies, as shown by the voting turnout for Clinton’s crime bill of 1994.41 State 
legislatures were also eager to jump on the “get tough” bandwagon, including 28 states that 
passed three strikes laws of their own, including historically liberal states like Massachusetts.42  
This bipartisan support for punitive drug policy on both the federal and state levels is an 
unusual phenomenon, considering that throughout this time period Democrats and Republicans 
were polarized on basically every other issue. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
moral panic that arose around the dangers of crack cocaine, inner city, crime, and other drug use 
and trafficking in general spread from the government to the wider public. As elected officials, 
both Republicans and Democrats had to respond to the media coverage and their constituents’ 
fears. For that reason, support for supply-side policies that focused on increased law enforcement 
and punitive measures began to become popular on both sides of the aisle. Subsequently, the 
cooperation, coordination, and support along party lines both on the federal and state levels for 
supply-side drug policy dominated the end of the 20th century and was crucial in guaranteeing 
that the War on Drugs policies would continue.  
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IV. Consequences of the Failed War on Drugs Policies  
Evidenced by these examples, the law-and-order perspective first introduced in the Nixon 
campaign was nearly hegemonic by the mid-1990s, and no other serious alternatives to the War 
on Drugs were entertained in mainstream political discourse until the 21st century.43 Although 
there were obviously other paths available to take concerning drug policy, supply-side policies 
ultimately triumphed. The failure of the drug war’s supply-side policies to curb drug trafficking, 
use, and addiction infamously led to many lasting, negative consequences, such as the 
militarization of state and local police, mass incarceration, and a substantial fiscal impact on the 
federal budget. For reasons largely unrelated to actual crime trends and drug misuse, the 
American criminal justice, judicial, and penal systems have emerged as a system of social 
control unparalleled in word history.44 This system is still the one we live in today, and has not 
yet been successful in mitigating any drug epidemics.  
The War on Drugs would not have been possible without the cooperation of state and 
local law enforcement agencies to carry it out in their own communities. Because drug use was 
declining when the war on drugs began, the announcement that these federal drug policies would 
need state and local participation was initially met with confusion and resistance from these 
departments. The federalization of drug crime violated the principle that street crime was local 
law enforcement’s domain, and many officials and officers were opposed to the federal 
government asserting itself into local crime fighting.45 Furthermore, there was a broad consensus 
among state and local police that other serious crimes, such as murder, theft, and assault were all 
of greater concern to most communities than illegal drug use.  
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This resistance was recognized by the Reagan administration, which consequently 
implemented two federal programs that aimed at gaining state and local law enforcement’s 
support for the drug war. In 1984, the DEA launched Operation Pipeline, which trained state and 
local law enforcement officers to use pretextual stops and consent searches as strategies for drug 
interdiction. By 2000, the DEA had trained more than 25,000 officers in 48 states in tactics such 
as using a minor traffic violation as a pretext to stop and search someone, how to lengthen a 
routine traffic stop and leverage it into a search for drugs, and how to use drug-sniffing dogs to 
obtain probable cause.46 The results of this program are mixed at best, and it is estimated that 
95% of Pipeline stops yielded no illegal drugs.47 As one former highway patrol officer from 
California put it, “you had to kiss a lot of frogs before you find a prince.”48 In hindsight, it is 
likely that this program wasted both millions of dollars of resources and the time and energy of 
local and state police departments.  
The other federal program instituted was the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local 
Law Enforcement Assistance Program, which gave huge cash grants to law enforcement 
agencies that were willing to make drug law enforcement a top priority in their jurisdictions.  
The fiscal incentives for the police departments were clear, because not only did they receive 
free weaponry, training, intelligence, and technical support from the DEA and the Pentagon, but 
they were also granted the authority to keep the majority of cash and assets they seized in drug 
raids. A report by the Department of Justice estimated that Byrne-funded drug task forces seized 
over $1 billion assets between 1998 and 1992.49 SWAT teams began to pop up in every major 
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American city, because the police departments suddenly had the money and military equipment 
to conduct military-like drug raids. By the late 1990s, an overwhelming majority of United States 
state and local law enforcement agencies had newly available resources, such as intelligence and 
military weaponry, training, and financial profits from participating in the War on Drugs. The 
federal government finally had the army it needed to fight its domestic drug war. 
The immediate result of these programs is the transition from community policing to 
military policing in American society. By transforming local police departments into 
paramilitary forces with access to DEA, Pentagon, and military intelligence, research, weapons, 
and other equipment for drug interdiction, they became increasingly involved in supply-side drug 
interdiction operations, despite the fact that drug enforcement is a federally mandated priority. 
The financial incentives provided by the federal government have not been well publicized, 
which has led to the reasonably assumed, although false, conclusion that if local police 
departments report increases in drug arrests, there must be a surge in illegal activity.50 As the 
police became increasingly militarized due to the supply-side based War on Drugs policies, they 
became, albeit not intentionally, a para-militarized force that focused on drug enforcement more 
than any other type of crime deemed important to their communities.  
Due in part to the success of the federal government in militarizing state and local police, 
one of the most visible consequences of the War on Drugs policies, especially because of the 
harsh penalties imposed on drug offenders, has been the explosion in mass incarceration. The 
number of Americans in jail was relatively stable until the 1970s. However, within the last thirty 
years, the U.S. penal population has risen from 300,000 to more than 2 million people, with drug 
convictions accounting for most of those incarcerated.51 The United States now boasts the 
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highest incarceration rates in the world, 6-10 times greater than those of other liberal, 
industrialized nations and even higher than repressive regimes like Russia, China, and Iran.52 
Drug arrests have tripled since 1980, and more than 31 million Americans have been arrested for 
drug crimes since the War on Drugs began. Drug offenses alone account for over two-thirds of 
the rise in the federal inmate population and more than half of the rise in state prisoners between 
1985-2000.53 There are now more people in prisons in jails today just for drug offenses than 
were incarcerated for all reasons in 1980.54 This rapid rise in incarceration rates is unprecedented 
in history, and coincides almost perfectly with the implementation of supply-side policies 
introduced in the 1970s. 
 The vast majority of those arrested are not charged with violent, serious, or high-level 
offenses. This is evidenced by the fact that by 2005 four out of five drug arrests were made for 
mere possession, while only one out of five were made for the intent to sell.55 The consequence 
of this phenomenon is that most incarcerated people in prison for drug offenses, especially state 
prisons, have no history of violence or significant selling activity. Furthermore, this approach 
clearly does not have an effect on curbing the supply of drugs, because of the focus on users and 
low-level dealers. For example, drug arrests for marijuana possession on the federal and state 
level accounted for nearly 80% of the of the drug arrests in the 1990s.56 It is unlikely that 
arresting, convicting, and incarcerating marijuana users and low-level dealers is going to help 
minimize the supply of drugs that the War on Drugs sought to get rid of, such as cocaine and 
heroin.  
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 Lastly, the War on Drugs has been an astronomic failure of economic policy. So far, over 
a trillion dollars has spent on the drug war, although there have been no significant reductions in 
drug availability, use, and addiction. The government now spends around $12.6 billion a year to 
house and care for hundreds of thousands of inmates, a cost of $25,251 per person annually as 
compared to the $10,591 spent to provide public education to a single student.57 The social costs 
of these policies can also not be understated, as roughly seven millions Americans are currently 
behind bars, on probation, or on parole.58 The consequences of having this many people in the 
criminal justice system –  on families, the court system, hospitals, and prisons –  cannot be 
emphasized enough. The War on Drugs persists today. The criminal justice system and law 
enforcement are still largely ineffective in curbing the overall supply of drugs. Treatment, 
prevention, and education programs focused on rehabilitation for addicts are still under-funded 
and under-staffed. The supply-side based, punitive policies spearheaded by the federal 
government and mimicked by state legislatures have created an American drug policy that has 
ultimately failed. Understanding the severity of the repercussions of the drug war is necessary in 
order to explain why the current opioid epidemic, which has been fueled by both federal and 
state policies, escalated so quickly. Policy makers are now at a critical moment, given the rapid 
development of the opioid crisis coupled with the failed criminal justice system created by the 
War on Drugs policies that keep millions of incarcerated and costs taxpayers money each year. 
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Chapter II: The Prescription Opioid Crisis as a Direct Cause of the Opioid Epidemic 
 
“It was sell, sell, sell. We were directed to lie. Why mince words about it? Greed took hold and 
overruled everything. They saw the potential for billions of dollars and just went after it.” 
– Shelby Sherman, former Sales Representative for Purdue Pharma 1974-1998 
 
I. Introduction 
 The current opioid epidemic can be best understood as a two-part process. It began with 
the overprescribing of prescription opioids in the late 1990s that in turn led directly to a rapid 
resurgence in illicit heroin use in the mid 2000s. An epidemic refers to the widespread 
occurrence of disease in a community at a particular time, and the crisis that has been created in 
the United States due to pervasive opioid misuse, abuse, and addiction is a prime example of this 
phenomenon.59 The abuse of and addiction to opioids such as heroin, fentanyl, and prescription 
opioid pain relievers (OPRs) is a serious national issue that effects the heath, social, and 
economic welfare of American society. The scope of the epidemic cannot be understated, 
considering that over two million Americans suffer from substance abuse disorders related to 
prescription opioid pain relievers, while an additional 500,000 suffer from heroin addictions.60 
Furthermore, the most recent available data reports that nearly 64,000 people died of drug 
overdoses in America in 2016, with synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl and heroin, and common 
opioid painkillers like OxyContin and Percocet accounting for over half of those overdoses.61 In 
an unprecedented, stunning moment in the history of United States public health, drug overdoses 
now are the leading cause of injury death, resulting in a higher death toll than both gun deaths 
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and car crashes. These statistics demonstrate the societal damage caused by the crisis, which 
began with the aggressive marketing, misinformation, and inappropriate overprescribing of 
prescription opioid pain relievers. Ultimately, this overprescribing culminated in the creation of 
an unprecedented demand for opioids that has come to define both waves of the opioid epidemic. 
In order to fully comprehend the most recent wave of the opioid crisis, it is crucial to briefly 
trace how the prescription opioid crisis first crafted the supply, and subsequently the demand, for 
opioids in the 21st century. Only then that policy solutions can be formulated. 
 
II. What are Opioids?  
The scope and magnitude of the opioid epidemic has reached epic proportions, and it is 
necessary to have a basic understanding of what opioids actually are, in regards to why their 
chemical makeup and characteristics make them more susceptible for abuse and addiction than 
other types of drugs. Simply speaking, opioids are analgesic agents, which means that they are 
used to relieve or manage moderate to severe pain.62 This class of drugs includes the illegal drug 
heroin (derived from morphine), synthetic opioids such as fentanyl and carfentanil, and legally 
prescribed pain relievers (OPRs) such as oxycodone (OxyContin), hydrocodone (Vicodin), 
codeine, and morphine.63 Medically, legal painkillers are primarily prescribed for cancer and 
chronic pain, and non-medically they are used for their euphoric effects or to prevent withdrawal. 
Whatever the use of the opioids may be, their most common side effects include itchiness, 
constipation, nausea, diarrhea, respiratory depression, and sedation.64 Going forward, it is useful 
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to define the many different forms of opioids as either legal (prescription opioid pain relievers), 
or illicit (heroin and other synthetic opioids).  
Opioids act by binding to specific opioid receptors in the nervous system, although the 
three classes have differing levels of potency. Unlike over-the-counter painkillers that merely 
block the production of chemicals in the body that create pain, such as Advil and Ibuprofen, 
opioids produce their pharmacological effects by acting directly on the central nervous system 
and brain.65 Thus, opioid analgesic effects are unique because they can quickly and intensely 
mute the propagation of pain signals throughout the body by desensitizing the central nervous 
system to its own natural opioid system, which then becomes less responsive on its own and can 
cause one to depend on the drug to produce those needed effects.66 Consequently, due to the 
powerful sense of pain relief and consequent feelings of euphoria that arise when the pain is 
relieved, opioids have a particular tendency for dependence compared to other classes of drugs.   
America’s complicated history with regulating the use of both legal and illegal forms of 
opioids began during the Civil War, when opium and morphine were used as medicine for 
soldiers, and then were prescribed to the rest of the public for ailments ranging from anxiety to 
chronic pain. However, the lack of other medications for illnesses and conditions at the time led 
to rampant narcotic overprescribing, and by 1919 the U.S. Supreme Court set up mechanisms to 
block doctors and pharmacists from providing morphine to patients.67 Subsequently, the abuse of 
these legal forms of opioids due to overprescribing fell drastically over the next century. 
Throughout the 20th century, waves of brief opioid epidemics resulted from increases in illicit 
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opioid use, most notably the heroin epidemic of the late 1960s and 1970s in minority-afflicted, 
poor, urban areas.68 Yet, this form of illegal opioid abuse and addiction fell rapidly as the “War 
on Drugs” began in the 1970s and cocaine and marijuana surpassed heroin in popularity.69 As 
discussed in considerable depth in the next section of this chapter, the creation and propagation 
of opioid pain relievers, such as OxyContin in the late 1990s, brought about another outbreak of 
the opioid epidemic, mainly due to the fact that they were legal, and at the time, fairly easy to 
obtain. Unlike the opioid crisis of the 19th century that also involved legal opioids, this 
prescription opioid crisis was not efficiently monitored or regulated by any level of government. 
Consequently, it unequivocally fueled the most current heroin and fentanyl crisis, both of which 
are illicit opioids. 
Taking into consideration that several waves of epidemics have occurred whether the 
type of opioid involved was legal or not, perhaps the most important characteristic of opioids to 
keep in mind for the purpose of this thesis is their extremely addictive nature, in both their legal 
and illicit formulations. Put simply, “opioids are highly addictive because they induce euphoria 
(positive reinforcement), and the cessation of chronic use produces dysphoria (negative 
reinforcement).”70 The chronic and repeated exposure to opioids through abuse and addiction 
results in structural and functional changes in regions of the brain that mediate affect, impulse, 
reward, and motivation.71 In other words, when opioids act on the brain, they trigger intense 
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feelings of pleasure that other types of drugs do not and alter the brain’s reward center in such a 
way that addicts are more likely to engage in further abuse. Furthermore, and after repeated 
exposure, an addict feels relatively normal when using the drugs and the awful withdrawal 
symptoms make it particular hard to quit.72 Lastly, opioids severely impair a user’s self-control, 
making it physically and psychologically harder to stop using even if the addict wants to. For 
someone suffering psychologically and physically from an opioid addiction, cheap and readily 
available illicit opioids, such as heroin and fentanyl, are an obvious choice and hard to say no to.  
 As discussed, legal prescription opioids are extremely similar, in terms of 
pharmacological characteristics and side effects, as illegal opioids. However, prescription 
opioids serve a legitimate medical purpose in the treatment of pain, and “their power to end or 
diminish pain is unquestioned when a patient has an immediate need, or over the longer term in 
treating cancer-related pain.”73 Therefore, the significance of a sustained-release opioid 
formulation, such as OxyContin and Percocet, which can be utilized for short-term pain 
treatment or long-term cancer pain, must be understood and their use in medical practice for 
these purposes is relatively safe. Nevertheless, there is still a need to be monitoring the use of 
these drugs. One of the most critical issues regarding the use of opioids for the treatment of these 
two types of pain is the potential for iatrogenic (illness caused by medical treatment) addiction. 
There are a number of studies which indicate that the use of opioids for long-term treatment of 
chronic pain can result in misuse and addiction. A recent literature review showed that the 
prevalence of addiction in patients with long-term opioid treatment for chronic non–cancer-
related pain varied from 12% to 50%, depending on the criteria used and the subpopulation 
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studied.74 These findings are demonstrated in numerous studies by Hoffman et al. (23%), Chabal 
et al. (34%), Katz et al. (43%),Reid et al. (24%–31%), and Michna et al. (45%).75 Furthermore, 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate that one in four people who received 
prescriptions (legally) like OxyContin currently struggle with an opioid addiction.76 While there 
is some variation in these studies, a general conclusion that can be drawn is that opioids still have 
abuse potential even when they are being used for medical purposes.  
 With these considerations in mind, it is not difficult to see why, due to their reputation for 
addiction and fatal overdoses, most opioids are classified as controlled substances by law. More 
recently, fentanyl and carfentanil, synthetic opioids that are significantly more addictive than 
morphine, are making their way into U.S. heroin supplies. Therefore, the addictive chemical 
nature of opioids is very important to keep in mind when reflecting on what opioids are, and why 
their unique characteristics have led to the pervasiveness of the crisis. Opiates are, in many ways, 
the paradigmatic drugs of addiction, and their distinct properties have made the crisis particularly 
difficult to alleviate compared to other drug epidemics.  
 
III. Brief History of the Prescription Opioid Crisis 1996-2010  
 Ironically, the root of the prescription opioid crisis stems from another epidemic, namely, 
the so-called pain epidemic that was addressed when opioid pain relievers were suddenly made 
widely available to the public. It is estimated that 100 million American adults suffer from either 
acute or chronic pain, and this pharmacological innovation was considered the “holy grail” for 
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some cancer-pain and chronic pain sufferers.77 However, this medical breakthrough was 
distorted and exploited by American prescription opioid manufacturers who oversold the drugs’ 
safety and thereby created a crisis of severe prescription opioid misuse and addiction. 
Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the rate of prescription opioid overdoses 
quadrupled, making it the worst epidemic in United States history.78 The “pain revolution” of the 
late 20th century, in conjunction with newly highly available opioid pain relievers during the 
same time period, created a perfect storm of overprescribing, abuse, and addiction that 
culminated in the prescription opioid crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
The Pain Revolution 
 One of the most astonishing aspects about the rapid progression of the prescription opioid 
epidemic is that prior to the mid-1980s, medical treatment with opioids was extremely 
stigmatized and was basically non-existent. This phenomenon of “opiophobia,” in which concern 
about the risks associated with opioids prevents the medical use of opioid analgesics, in part 
stemmed from the heroin epidemics of the late 1960s and 1970s of returning Vietnam veterans 
and in inner-city, poor, urban areas.79 Subsequently, physicians were reluctant to prescribe opioid 
drugs available at the time on a long-term basis for common chronic conditions due to concerns 
of opioid addiction, tolerance, and physiological dependence that they frequently saw with 
heroin use.  
 The “opiophobia” homogeneity among those in the medical profession changed 
drastically with the publication of one article, Portenoy and Foley’s 1986 paper “Chronic Use of 
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Opioid Analgesics in Non-Malignant Pain: Report of 38 Cases”. As the title suggests, the paper 
describes the treatment of 38 chronic pain patients using opioid pain relievers and concluded that 
they could be prescribed safely on a long-term basis without a significant chance of addiction.80 
Despite relatively inconsistent and low-quality evidence, the paper began to become widely cited 
by other scholars, pain specialists, and medical professionals to support the expanded use of 
opioids for chronic, non-cancer pain. Although treating long-term pain with opiates went against 
many long-held beliefs in the medical field, “Foley published what became a declaration of 
independence for the vanguard of pain specialists interested in using opiates for chronic pain 
despite other researchers fears that this could be addictive.”81 What is perhaps most astonishing 
is that the National Institute of Health, a federal agency, funded the research and publication of 
this article. For pain specialists, pain organizations, and later opioid manufacturing companies 
who started to create prescription opioid pain relievers of this kind, this article and its circulation 
throughout the rest of the medical community opened the floodgates for the pain revolution to 
begin.  
 After articles like Portenoy and Foley’s started to persuade doctors, scholars, and other 
members of the medical field to rethink how pain could be treated, the “pain revolution”, the 
overall movement in the medical profession to recognize a patient’s right to the assessment and 
management of pain, started to gain even more momentum from pain organizations and 
societies. One of the most important developments of this kind was the American Pain Society’s 
introduction of its “Pain is the 5th Vital Sign” campaign at its annual society meeting in 1995, in 
which it’s president “encouraged health care professionals to assess pain with the same “zeal” as 
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they do with vital signs and urged for the more aggressive use of opioids for chronic non-cancer 
pain” in his opening address.82 The fact that pain, measured on a subjective scale of 1 through 
10, should be added as another clinical measurement of vital signs that include pulse rate, 
temperature, respiration rate, and blood pressure, was unprecedented in medical history up to this 
point in time.  
 Other well-known and powerful organizations soon followed suit, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared freedom from pain as a “universal right” in 1995, while the 
Veterans Association (VA) and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO) both adopted the idea of pain as the fifth vital sign by 2000.83 
Physicians followed the advice from these organizations and started to treat pain as a serious 
medical issue by the mid-1990s. This monumental shift in how doctors diagnosed and treated 
pain was mostly in good faith, considering that millions of Americans suffer from chronic pain. 
However, what is most astounding about this revolution is that throughout this transformative 
era, “pain specialists and addiction specialists rarely crossed paths… even today, despite a 
national movement to treat pain with addictive drugs, the two specialties, remarkably, still don’t 
have much contact, [and] there are no joint conferences where the two specialties might meet.”84 
This disconnect is extremely important to note going forward due to the fact that these new types 
of prescription opioids, which had the capacity be extremely addictive was, at best, unknown by 
these “pain crusaders,” and at worst, flat-out ignored.  
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Purdue Pharma and the Rise of OxyContin 
 
 More so than any other pharmaceutical manufacturing company, Purdue Pharma is 
responsible for taking advantage of the pain revolution to aggressively market their “billion-
dollar pill”, OxyContin, which subsequently became the main driver behind the prescription 
opioid epidemic. The tale of Purdue Pharma and OxyContin is in many ways an American story 
as old as time: one of a rich, powerful corporation’s greed that ultimately caused unfathomable 
societal harms against the rest of the population. Purdue Pharma was purchased by the three 
Sackler brothers in 1952, and it was a relatively small and non-profitable company until it 
became entrenched in the pain business in the 1970s when they created a time-released morphine 
pill called MS Contin.85 As opiophobia subsided, Richard Sackler, Raymond Sackler’s son who 
was one of the executives of Purdue Pharma following his father’s retirement, started to search 
for new applications for Purdue’s time-released Contin system, as morphine had a negative 
stigmatization as a “dying” drug.86 The result was OxyContin, the brand-name drug for the 
extended-release formulation of oxycodone. OxyContin quickly made the Sackler family billions 
of dollars as it was the first pharmaceutical company to achieve a dominant share of the new 
market for long-acting opioids. As the Sackler family became rich, millions of Americans started 
to suffer from addiction, overdose, and overdose deaths due to their marketing strategies.  
 OxyContin is a simple pill. It contains only one drug, oxycodone, a semisynthetic opioid 
molecularly similar to heroin that produces similar euphoric effects to other types of opioids.87 
At the time, Purdue’s use of the Contin system, which gradually released oxycodone over a 
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period of twelve hours, was seen as a key innovation as it meant that people only had to take two 
pills a day instead of six or eight.88 Moreover, due to the long-lasting nature of the opioid, 
OxyContin was formulated in incredibly high doses, up to 80 and 160 mg.89 However, in terms 
of abuse, OxyContin could be easily crushed, snorted, or injected and the person using it would 
then receive all of the oxycodone at once. This factor paved the way for it to soon become the 
most widely abused prescription opioid.90 Other opiate painkillers, such as Vicodin and Percocet, 
are combined with either acetaminophen or Tylenol, which makes them hard to liquefy or 
inject.91 Yet even those were abused. OxyContin’s extremely high doses coupled with the fact 
that it’s only ingredient is oxycodone was the first of its kind in the medical field. These qualities 
make it clear as to how a drug similar to heroin, that began to be prescribed basically like an 
over-the-counter medication, became so popular for misuse and abuse and subsequently the main 
force behind the prescription opioid epidemic. 
 Purdue Pharma released OxyContin on the market in 1996, and by that time the pain  
revolution had been changing the minds of American medical professionals for over a decade. 
Thus, Purdue Pharma and other similar opioid manufacturing companies began to market their 
products aggressively. From 1996 through 2002, Purdue Pharma funded more than 20,000 pain-
related educational programs for prescribers through direct sponsorship or financial grants, and 
also launched a multifaceted campaign to encourage the long-term use of opioid pain relievers 
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for chronic non-cancer pain.92 In theory, it would be assumed that these types of programs would 
have been extremely helpful for doctors, as this was a new type of drug that had never been 
widely prescribed before. However, Purdue representatives routinely presented false evidence 
about the efficacy of using opioids for chronic non-cancer related pain. For example, they told 
doctors that the likelihood of addiction for patients prescribed opioids for long-term use was less 
than 1%.93 As recent studies have shown, that probability is more like 23 to 45%.94 Pain 
specialists, doctors, and scholars were also offered perks to present this false evidence95, and it is 
likely that this type of pharmaceutical company symposium greatly influenced physicians’ 
prescribing habits.   
 In addition to flooding the medical field with misinformation about the effectiveness and 
addictive tendencies of OxyContin, Purdue also launched a high-cost promotion strategy that 
provided substantial financial support to pain organizations and groups such as the American 
Pain Society, the American Academy of Pain Medicine, the Federal and State Medical Boards, 
and pain patient group. In turn, these groups all advocated for more aggressive identification and 
treatment of pain, and of course the use of opioid pain relievers for all types of pain 
management.96 Another component of this campaign was to provide “kickbacks” to the entire 
OxyContin’s distribution chain, meaning that “wholesalers got rebates in exchange for keeping 
OxyContin off prior authorization lists (which requires routine clinical coverage reviews based 
on medical necessity for the drug being prescribed). In addition, pharmacists got refunds “on 
their initial orders, patients got coupons for thirty-day starter supplies, academics got grants, 
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medical journals got millions in advertising, [and] Senators and members of Congress on key 
committees got donations from Purdue and from members of the Sackler family.”97 Offering 
freebies to doctors and other members of the medical profession was not necessarily uncommon 
in the pharmaceutical industry. However, this level of false advertising, marketing, and 
information had never been seen before in the promotion of a highly addictive, Schedule II 
narcotic.  
Another key part of Purdue’s marketing strategy was to expand the number of its internal 
sales representatives, whose job was to persuade physicians to prescribe OxyContin not only for 
chronic pain, but for basically any pain ailment, including toothaches and minor migraines. From 
1996 to 2000, Purdue increased its internal sales force from 318 to 671, and its total physician 
call list from 33,4000 to 94,000 physicians.98 They specifically targeted certain geographical 
regions, such as Rustbelt areas that were suffering from high rates of unemployment due to post- 
industrialization, where the proclivity for abuse was high. From 1998 through 2000, in areas 
such as West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, southwestern Virginia, and Alabama, hydrocodone and 
oxycodone were being prescribed 2.5 to 5.0 times more than the national average.99 It is these 
areas that were, and still are, most deeply affected by the opioid epidemic.   
 The profit made from Purdue Pharma’s aggressive marketing strategy is staggering. In 
1996, its first year on the market, OxyContin’s annual sales totaled $48 million dollars.100 By 
2010, that number was up to $3.1 billion dollars, and accounted for over 30% of the entire 
analgesic (pain relievers) market.101 By the 21st century, OxyContin had become the most 
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frequently prescribed branded opioid for treating moderate to severe pain – and the availability 
of high doses of this potent opioid likely contributed to its popularity for misuse. In terms of 
monetary profit, OxyContin could not have been a greater success. 
As these statistics demonstrate, the false advertising, miseducation, and inappropriate 
marketing of OxyContin by Purdue Pharma clearly had a great effect on the physicians 
prescribing it. For the most part, these physicians were well-meaning doctors and nurses who 
were given incorrect information about how dangerously addictive this prescription drug could 
be. Primary care physicians (PCPs) were particularly targeted by Purdue’s promotional 
campaigns, educational programs, and sales representatives, and subsequently became the main 
prescribers of OxyContin. In fact, by 2003, more than half of the prescribers of OxyContin were 
PCPs, despite the fact that they had limited training in pain management.102 Furthermore, Purdue 
had a database that helped sales representative identify both physicians with large numbers of 
chronic pain patients and also the most frequent prescribers of opioids.103 Doctors were 
persuaded to treat pain as a serious medical issue, and there is good reason for that considering 
chronic pain is absolutely debilitating for sufferers. However, the pharmaceutical industry’s role 
and influence in medical education, especially for an entirely new kind of drug, is undoubtedly 
problematic.  
Another shocking aspect about the rapid rise of OxyContin is the overall lack of oversight 
by federal agencies such as the FDA. Ironically, OxyContin’s twelve hour long-lasting formula 
is what led FDA officials to initially believe that it would be “less attractive to abusers since 
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absorption of the drug would be delayed.”104 Of course, this line of thinking did not take into 
account that OxyContin could be easily crushed, snorted, or injected by abusers to receive all 
twelve hours of oxycodone at once. However, once again the real blame can be attributed to 
Purdue Pharma. Purdue regularly distributed copies of OxyContin promotional videos, most 
notably to 15,000 to physicians in 1998, without submitting it to the first FDA for review.105 By 
2001, Purdue submitted a second version of the video to the FDA, yet it did not review it until 
October of 2002, when it concluded that it minimized the risks of OxyContin and made 
unsubstantiated claims regarding its benefits.106 The combination of an aggressive marketing 
strategy, misinformation for prescribers, and an overall lack of oversight all contributed to the 
rapid spread of OxyContin throughout the United States. 
Immediate Consequences: Societal Harms and Policies 
 The consequences of flooding American society with an extremely addictive drug, and 
declaring it as the cure for basically any type of pain under the sun, started to appear almost 
immediately after OxyContin’s release in 1996. From 1997-2011, there was a 900% increase in 
individuals seeking treatment for addiction to opioid pain relievers and as of 2014, OxyContin 
was still the most widely prescribed opioid with an estimated 245 million prescriptions 
dispensed, almost enough for each person in the United States to have a bottle.107 Today, more 
than 4% of the adult American population currently misuses prescription opioids, and roughly 
$80 billion of U.S. taxpayers’ dollars is spent annually on the societal costs of prescription 
opioid use, including criminal justice, correctional, and policing costs.108 In terms of supply and 
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demand, the creation, marketing, and distribution of OxyContin by companies like Purdue 
Pharma created the demand for prescription opioids by saturating the market with a large supply 
of legal, easily-prescribed, and highly addictive drugs that were basically non-existent prior to 
the release of OxyContin in 1996. In this light, by creating the highest supply and demand for 
opioids in centuries, opioid manufacturing companies bear the most responsibility in 
proliferating the prescription opioid crisis.  
In terms of legal recourse, there have been multiple lawsuits brought against Purdue 
Pharma by both states and individuals. One of the most noteworthy cases was settled in 2007, 
when Purdue pleaded guilty to misleading users about the risk of addiction with OxyContin use, 
which led to an over $600 million settlement for criminal and civil charges. Individual 
executives also paid $34.5 million out of their own pockets and performed four hundred hours of 
community service.109 This settlement was among the largest in the history of the pharmaceutical 
industry at the time. While this monetary settlement may seem greatly inadequate, considering 
that a quarter of a million people have died from prescription opioid overdoses since 1996, it is a 
step in the right direction. More and more lawsuits are being brought against pharmaceutical 
companies every year, and it is likely that in the next coming years more companies, executives, 
and sales representatives will be held accountable.  
In regards to immediate policy responses, the adverse consequences of the 
overprescribing of opioid pain relievers were not noticed on a wide-scale range until about 
fifteen years after OxyContin was released. As will be discusses in the next chapter in more 
depth, there have been two significant policy responses to the crisis since then. First, in 2010, 
OxyContin was reformulated in an “abuse-deterrent” design, which made it mostly impossible 
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for addicts to abuse.”110 The second response was by individual states, 23 of which started to 
pass prescribing limits legislation in 2016. Most of these legislative efforts limit first-time opioid 
prescriptions to a specific number of days’ supply, while others also set dosage limits.111 In a 
more symbolic response, the American Medical Association (AMA) recently recommended that 
pain be removed as the 5th vital sign112, and the Center for Disease Control (CDC) added opioid 
prescription overdose prevention to its list of top five public health challenges of 2013.113 While 
mostly rhetorical, these changes will hopefully set the tone for the rest of the medical field, as 
they did previously with the pain revolution.   
In February 2018, Purdue Pharma announced that it would stop marketing opioid drugs to 
doctors. This drastic move came about amid a series of state and municipal lawsuits that blame 
the company for contributing to the opioid epidemic, and the company promised to cut its sales 
force by more than 50%.114 This is a monumental step, however, it may have come a little too 
late. Mainly due to reformulation and prescribing limits, the misuse and abuse of prescription 
opioids has gradually declined from a high of 2.7 million nonmedical users in 2002, to 1 million 
users in 2012.115 While the prescription portion of the epidemic seems to have been reduced to a 
great degree do to these policies, they have unfortunately contributed to the next part of the 
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opioid epidemic: the heroin and fentanyl crisis. The next chapter will go into further discussion 
about how, and why, the curbing of prescription opioid availability, use, and addiction 
inadvertently led to the second wave of the opioid epidemic.  
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Chapter III: The Heroin and Fentanyl Epidemic and Current Federal Policy Reponses 
 
“The terrorist threat families in America see is not in the streets of Aleppo. It’s fentanyl coming 
down your street” – Senator Ed Markey, Speech at the National Rx Drug Abuse & Heroin 
Summit, March 2016 
 
I. Introduction 
 
At its core, the opioid epidemic is an epidemic of addiction. As discussed in Chapter One, 
the economic theory of supply and demand predicts that “policies which reduce the supply of 
drugs – through mechanisms such as enforcement, monitoring, and interdiction – should increase 
drug prices and diminish their availability, lowering the overall demand for the drug.”116 
However, this reasoning does not account for the addictive nature of drugs. Even if a supply-side 
strategy was successful in completely eradicating the “supply” of a drug, the “demand” (the 
addicted users) still remains. More often than not, drug users then turn to substitute drugs when 
the initial supply becomes unavailable in order to feed their addiction. This phenomenon 
becomes even more complicated in terms of the opioid epidemic, due to the fact that both legal 
and illegal opioids are abused and are particularly subject to extremely high rates of addiction. 
Given the severity of the epidemic, there has been a major effort by the federal and state 
governments to address it, most of which have consisted of supply-side based responses. Despite 
the relative ineffectiveness of these approaches, supply-side interventions for opioid abuse have 
continued to dominate the political discourse surrounding drug policy. While these policies have 
reduced the availability of legal prescription opioids, they have also directly caused the second 
phase of the crisis. The presence of substitutes, in this case widely available and cheap heroin 
and fentanyl, limits the scope for these types of supply-side interventions to effectively reduce 
the overall misuse and abuse of opioids, even if they are initially successful in targeting one 
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specific type of the drug (i.e. prescription opioids) in the supply chain. There is currently no end 
in sight for this next phase of the opioid crisis, due to the implementation of supply-side policies 
that are aimed solely at the prescription side of the epidemic and incompetent leadership on the 
federal level. By evaluating how these strictly supply-side drug policies have led directly to the 
rapid increase in heroin and fentanyl use, this chapter will make it clear why a combination of 
both supply-side and demand-side based strategies is necessary to successfully curtail the opioid 
epidemic.  
 
II. Prescription Opioid Crisis Policy Responses and Immediate Consequences 
In an unfortunate, ironic, twist of fate, the policy responses put in place to curb the 
prescription opioid epidemic inadvertently caused the next wave of the crisis, which is mainly 
driven by the rampant use of heroin and fentanyl. The damaging consequences of the 
prescription opioid epidemic were first recorded on a wide-scale around 2010. Subsequently, two 
significant supply-side policies were quickly implemented that focused on immediately 
eliminating the supply of prescription opioid pain relievers available on the legal and illegal 
markets. These two policy responses included the reformulation of the legal opioid responsible 
for initiating the crisis, OxyContin, into an abuse-deterrent form, and the implementation of 
individual state prescribing limits for prescription pain relievers. These strategies were overall 
successful in reducing the amount of prescription opioid abuse, considering the abuse rate for 
opioid pain relievers decreased from .56 per 100,000 of the population to .35 per 100,000 of the 
population between 2010 and 2013.117 However, this exceptionally unique supply disruption, in 
which almost the entire production of opioid pain relievers was discontinued practically 
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overnight, led to a sudden negative supply shock of abusable prescription opioids. Consequently, 
many addicts, whose “demand” still required a fix, turned to heroin as a readily available 
substitute.  
Reformulation 
 
Following the unprecedented increase in prescription opioid availability, misuse, and 
addiction throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, the FDA approved the reformulation of 
OxyContin into an “abuse-deterrent” design in 2010. The new formulations were either physical 
(e.g. a viscous gel was formed when crushed), or chemical (e.g. a low dose of an opioid 
antagonist was in incorporated in the formulation and released upon crushing).”118 Both the 
physical and chemical formulations aimed to discourage misuse by addicts who crushed the pill 
for injection or inhalation purposes, the two most common forms of abuse. As one addict put it, 
“Oxy was getting harder and harder to get, and the pills you could get, most of them would just 
‘gel-up’.”119  In matter of a few months, OxyContin, the main prescription opioid pain reliever 
on the market, became almost impossible for addicts to acquire and abuse.  
 The reformulation of OxyContin would not have been possible without the efforts of 
federal and state officials, who pressured opioid manufacturing companies like Purdue Pharma to 
design an abuse-deterrent formula, and the FDA, which ultimately approved the formulation. 
However, the government and its agencies did not consider that although this strategy helped 
diminish prescription abuse, a large disruption to the supply of abusable opioids had the 
unintended consequence of leading millions of addicts to turn to more dangerous and potent 
opioids as substitutes, most commonly heroin. The correlation between the sudden decrease in 
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prescription opioid availability and the increase in heroin use has been documented in a ground-
breaking study by Alpert et al., which found that “states with higher pre-2010 rates of OxyContin 
misuse experienced large differential increases in heroin deaths immediately after reformulation, 
potentially due to the substitution towards other opioids, including more harmful synthetic 
opioids such as fentanyl.”120 These results indicate that a substantial share of the dramatic 
increase in heroin deaths since 2010 can be attributed to the reformulation of OxyContin. 
 This is not to say that every person addicted to prescription opioids switched to heroin 
use, especially considering the social costs associated with acquiring and using illegal drugs, 
such as coming into regular contact with drug dealers and the uncertainty of illicit heroin’s 
chemical makeup. Nevertheless, the available literature does demonstrate that a significant 
portion of the prescription opioid addicted population did switch to non-medical, illicit options. 
For example, a study by Cicero and Ellis found that 70% of their interviewed subjects responded 
to the abuse-deterrent formulation by switching to heroin use.121 Furthermore, it has been 
repeatedly documented that four out of five (80%) of current heroin users began their addictions 
with the abuse of prescription opioids.122 These statistics highlight the common misconception 
that in terms of addictive drugs, getting rid of one supply is not going to subsequently decrease 
the demand.  
 It could be argued that the amount of heroin overdose deaths started to spike around 2010 
solely because of the introduction of fentanyl, an extremely potent synthetic opioid, into the U.S. 
heroin supply. However, heroin overdose deaths were not correlated with OxyContin misuse 
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prior to the reformulation. This is evidenced by the fact that heroin-related overdoses more than 
tripled between 2010 to 2014 from 1.0 to 3.4 deaths per 100,000, after remaining relatively 
constant between 1999 and 2010.123 In other words, it is likely that the main reason for the 
increase in heroin use, and consequently heroin overdose deaths, was because prescription 
opioids became less available for abuse following reformulation in 2010. Furthermore, as 
discussed in more depth in the next section of this chapter, fentanyl did not become regularly 
injected in to the U.S. heroin supply until around 2013, three years after the reformulation of 
OxyContin. While this opioid policy disrupted virtually the entire supply of prescription opioids 
for nonmedical use, the availability of unregulated substitute drugs severely undermined the 
effectiveness of this particular strategy.  
State Prescribing Limits 
 As federal government agencies like the FDA pressured the pharmaceutical companies to  
reformulate OxyContin into an abuse-deterrent form, individual states also began to take action 
in an attempt to reduce the prescription opioid epidemic by instituting their own state prescribing 
limits. As previously mentioned, the false information provided to doctors by pharmaceutical 
companies resulted in primary care physicians to become the leading prescription opioid 
prescribers. Consequently, the amount of opioids prescribed in 2010 was more than three times 
higher than in 1999.124 However, once studies and research began to show high rates of misuse 
and addiction among both medical and nonmedical prescription opioid users, the CDC released 
its “Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain” in 2016, which offered primary care 
providers a set of voluntary, evidence-based recommendations for prescribing opioids to 
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patients.125 These guidelines were soon adopted by state governments, many of which started to 
pass legislative limits on opioid prescriptions around 2016. 
 Massachusetts was the first state to set prescribing limits in early 2016, and soon other 
states that have been disproportionately affected by the opioid crisis began to follow suit. As of 
today, twenty-three states have passed laws that include some type of limit, guidance, or 
requirement related to opioid prescribing.126 Most of this legislation limits first-time opioid 
prescriptions to a certain number of days’ supply, with seven days being the most common.127 In 
some cases, states also set dosage limits, and nearly half of these states set limits that apply to 
treating acute pain, as differentiated from chronic pain.128 Many states also included exemptions 
for the use of prescription opioids for the treatment of cancer or palliative pain, as studies have 
shown very low addiction rates for the shorter-term treatment of these types of ailments. 
 Again, similar to the reformulation of OxyContin, these policies had an immediately 
positive effect on prescription opioid abuse in the United States. While prescriptions for opioid 
analgesics increased steadily from 2002 to 2012, they started to decrease in 2016, the year that 
states started to implement their own prescribing limits. This phenomenon is substantiated by the 
fact that the overall national opioid prescribing rate dropped from 81.3 to 66.5 prescriptions for 
100 persons within that same timeframe.129 Furthermore, although the data is preliminary, the 
amount of overdoses and overdose deaths relating to prescription opioids, as opposed to illicit 
opioids, has also decreased since 2016.130 Yet, again the lower rates must be considered within 
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the wider context of the entire opioid epidemic. It is likely that the state prescribing limits 
prevented many addicts from obtaining prescription opioids and severely limited the amount of 
opioid painkillers available on both the legal and illegal markets. Subsequently, as seen with the 
reformulation of OxyContin, state prescribing limits also contributed to the unintended rise in 
heroin and fentanyl use starting around 2016.  
Consequences of the Rise in Heroin and Fentanyl Use 
 Although pharmacologically similar to prescription opioids, illicit heroin and fentanyl use 
presents some greater risks in terms of the likelihood of an overdose or overdose fatality. This is 
mainly because unlike legal prescription opioids, heroin is illegal, and therefore there is a “lack 
of control over the purity of the drug and its potential adulteration with other drugs. In the case 
of adulteration with highly potent opioids such as fentanyl or carfentanil, this can be particularly 
deadly.”131 As the availability of prescription opioids diminished due to the policies outlined 
above, many users consequently turned to heroin as a substitute for their opioid addictions. 
Heroin has been a persistent issue for decades in American drug policy, however, this problem 
has recently reemerged at extremely high rates. Recent reports from the DEA highlight a 143% 
increase in heroin seizures between 2010 and 2015, while the heroin price per milligram has 
declined to historically low levels.132 The combination of a wider availability and lower costs has 
likely also played a role in the increase of heroin use. Furthermore, because this cheap and 
available heroin has become the main substitute for prescription opioids, the supply is likely to 
remain pretty consistent as long as the demand (the number of users) stays the same. This 
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positive supply shock of heroin in the United States demonstrates that as the supply of 
prescription opioids disappeared, illicit opioids such as heroin started to increase in order to meet 
the demand of the addicted users. 
 Perhaps even more troubling than the increase in heroin use alone is the recent injection 
of illicitly manufactured fentanyl as a “filler” into the U.S. heroin supply. From 2013 to 2015, 
the number of fentanyl seizures by the DEA increased from 1,000 to 13,000, the largest DEA 
drug seizure increase in American history.133 Fentanyl is a powerful synthetic opioid that is 30-
50 times more potent than heroin, which is availably legally as a prescription, primarily for 
anesthesia and treating post-surgical pain.134 It is highly fat-soluble, which allows it to rapidly 
enter the brain, leading to a faster and more intense onset of its effects than heroin.135 This high 
potency and quick onset makes fentanyl users particularly susceptible to extreme withdrawal 
symptoms, as well as overdoses and overdose deaths. Thus, it is extremely likely that fentanyl 
now plays a major role in the rising mortality rates involving heroin or other opioid overdoses. 
The rise of fentanyl use reflects the drug’s potency and low production costs. While 
heroin, already considered a relatively inexpensive drug, costs about $65,000 per kilogram 
wholesale, illicit fentanyl is available at about $3,500 per kilogram.136 Moreover, one kilogram 
of illicit fentanyl, again far cheaper than heroin or oxycodone, can produce one million 
counterfeit pills, netting between $10 to $20 million in revenue.137 Therefore, there is a high 
monetary incentive for drug dealers to “fill” their heroin and other street drug supplies with 
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fentanyl in order to drastically increase their profits. However, “producing precise fentanyl doses 
requires specialized equipment and knowledge, and street-level dealers who are unwilling or 
unable to provide precise dosing create especially acute overdose risks.”138 In other words, 
because fentanyl is so incredibly potent, most drug dealers are unaware of how much of it can 
cause an overdose.   
In terms of human costs, this wave of the epidemic is reaching historically disastrous 
proportions. Because fentanyl is most commonly mixed in with a heroin supply, most users are 
unaware that they are using it, which is of course more powerful than heroin used alone. As one 
user put it, “now the dope is fentanyl and its killing people left and right… over the years I’ve 
watched friends [die from an overdose], but on average it was three a year. Now the last three 
years it’s been an average of 20.”139 This observation is becoming all too common, and 
emphasizes the time sensitivity aspect of dealing with the crisis. Unlike, say alcoholism, which 
usually does not prove fatal until permanent organ damage develops over a few decades, fentanyl 
is so incredibly potent that it is causing multitudes of addicts to overdose and die every single 
day. National overdose deaths attributed to fentanyl began to increase in 2013 from a stable level 
of approximately 1,600 annually in 2010-2012 to 1,905 in 2013, and then by a further 120% to 
4,200 in 2015.140 As these statistics demonstrate, fentanyl-infused heroin overdoses are 
continuing to rise with no signs of abating, and it is unlikely that it will any time soon due to the 
non-existent supply of prescription opioids, and the nuanced, ineffective responses from the 
federal and most state governments.  
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III. Current Executive and Congressional Policy Responses the Opioid Epidemic 
 
 The opioid epidemic has become an increasingly relevant topic of interest throughout the 
last two presidential administrations. Yet, despite the unique dangers presented by this crisis that 
have been outlined above, American drug policy has been “frozen in place since crack cocaine 
hit the cities in the mid 1980s.”141 This is mainly due to the failed War on Drugs supply-side 
policies and inconsistent leadership on the federal level. The Obama administration was 
successful in instituting a shift in the rhetoric surrounding addiction and implemented critical 
first steps in health care reform that have positively impacted addicts. However, the Trump 
administration is now aiming to derail that progress. The current federal push to return to a “law 
and order” approach for drug policy, discoordination between the government and federal drug 
agencies, lack of political discussion aimed at demand-side policies, and plans to reshape the 
health care system are of particular concern. Considering this type of approach led to the failed 
drug war policies, it is crucial to discuss the policies that have been recently implemented in 
order to demonstrate why little headway is being made, in spite of the extensive amount of 
national attention now given to the epidemic.  
Obama Administration 
 Because the opioid epidemic has been an ongoing crisis since the early 2000s, some 
critics contend that Obama did not do enough throughout his presidency to address it, as he did 
not speak publically about the crisis until his last two years in office. However, before instituting 
a national drug policy that could focus more on demand-side initiatives than supply-side 
strategies, first his administration had to reform the failing health care system in a way that 
would subsidize drug addiction as a disease which could be included under regular medical 
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coverage. President Obama did institute several significant changes in the health care system, 
most notably the passing of the Affordable Care Act which had some positive effects on addicts. 
Unfortunately, many of these efforts were routinely blocked by Congress and likely weakened 
the overall success of these policies. For example, despite his efforts, during his two terms the 
amount of overdose deaths nearly doubled, from 36,450 in 2008 to more than 63,600 in 2016. 142 
That being said, there are a few noteworthy reforms, specifically within the U.S. health care 
system, that have, and continue to, provide more treatment, rehabilitation, and coverage for 
opioid addicts.  
 In Obama’s first year in office, Congress narrowly passed the Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Act, which greatly improved insurance coverage for people suffering from mental 
health and addiction disorders. Historically, addiction treatment has been characterized as a 
“behavioral” health issue, which is not covered well under regular medical health insurance. 
However, this act “require[s] parity (equality) in coverage (benefits for mental health and 
substance abuse), often referred collectively as “behavioral health,” that are equivalent to all 
other medical and surgical benefits.143 In other words, this act was a crucial step in altering the 
U.S. health care system in a way that ensures health insurance plans would treat substance use 
disorders the same way as they treat other medical conditions, mainly by requiring more 
accountability in payer practices.144 Unfortunately, the impact of this legislation is mostly 
negligible, as the law did not apply to the large proportion of self-insured employers and 
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unemployed persons, many of whom were addicts.145 This provision was mostly due to partisan 
wrangling on the part of the Republicans, who generally did not support this type of reform or 
Obama’s democratic ideology. Nevertheless, this act was still a monumental feat in the 
recognition that addiction should be considered a disease, and subsequently was the first stride in 
bringing addiction services into the mainstream health care system. 
Perhaps the most important legacy of the Obama administration was the successful 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act in 2010. The act “represents the U.S. healthcare 
system’s most significant regulatory overhaul and expansion of coverage since the passage of 
Medicaid and Medicare in the 1960s.”146 In terms of the opioid crisis, there are a few key 
provisions that have improved the American health care system’s access and system 
fragmentation issues, which have negatively affected people suffering from addiction and other 
substance use disorders in the past. First off, the expansion of Medicaid coverage provided 9.5 
million previously uninsured people with health insurance.147 Of these 9.5 million people, it is 
estimated that 20-30% (around 2 or 3 million) are afflicted with some form of addiction or 
substance abuse disorder.148 The new availability of coverage itself to millions of Americans 
plagued with addiction, most prominently opioid addiction, has clearly had a positive impact on 
the amount of people now able to seek treatment.149 
Another key provision of the ACA goes beyond the requirements of the Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act by mandating that both Medicaid benchmark plans and plans 
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that operate through the state-based insurance exchanges both cover behavioral health services as 
part of an “essential benefits package.”150 In other words, the ACA expanded the number of 
addicted people who can receive essential treatment, such as Medication-Assisted Treatment 
(MAT), and other treatment services through either private or public insurance.151 This was an 
extremely important change in policy because it officially deemed addiction treatment an 
“essential health benefit”. As addiction specialist Dr. Anna Lembke bluntly contends, this has 
done more to enforce parity reimbursement than anything before or since, because “if you don’t 
pay doctors to treat addiction, they won’t.”152 As an extension of the concept introduced in the 
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, this ACA provision expanded access for people 
with substance abuse disorders both within the specialty addiction sector and general medical 
care. 
 Lastly, not only did the ACA start to cover more people struggling with addiction, but it 
also provided states that took the Medicaid expansion with enhanced federal funding. Put simply, 
this funding gave states the additional resources they needed to cover adults suffering from 
addiction who were still excluded from the health care system. The importance of the state 
expansion is highly significant because Medicaid now covers nearly four in to ten adults that 
struggle with an opioid addiction.153 The states that have taken the expansion cover at least one 
in three medications that can help with opioid addiction (methadone, buprenorphine, and 
naltrexone), and also cover a wide range of treatment services including detox, partial 
hospitalization, intensive outpatient care, and case management.154 Furthermore, in the thirty-
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three Medicaid expansion states, uninsured hospitalizations related to behavioral health have 
substantially decreased.155 Consequently, not only are these programs providing coverage for 
addicts, but they are also likely saving the federal and state governments money in the long run 
because of the reduction in uninsured hospital visits, which are extremely costly. Moreover, 
several studies indicate that treatment spending saves money in the long run, with every $1 spent 
on treatment saving as much as $7 in social costs.156 These states now have new resources that 
are necessary for treating people addicted to opioids, and have clearly already seen the positive 
effects of these policies, in terms of both treatment accessibility for those who need it and 
economically. 
In addition to the progress made under the ACA, the Comprehensive Addiction and 
Recovery Act of July 2016 (CARA), was explicitly designed to expand treatment programs and 
develop alternatives to opioid painkillers, supported by a budget of more than $180 million 
annually to address the crisis. More specifically, the act authorized the National Institute of 
Health (NIH) to accelerate research on developing non-opioid painkillers, awarded additional 
grants to states for addiction treatments such as MAT, allows nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants to prescribe buprenorphine, and symbolically recognizes that recovery is a long-term 
process and that addicts suffer from a disease.157  
CARA was the first major piece of addiction legislation in decades and the first policy 
initiative by the Obama administration that directly addressed the opioid epidemic. However, 
many addiction specialists and drug policy scholars agree that it can be summarized as 
“something that appears real on the surface but has no substance,” as it did not include a direct 
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funding appropriation, and merely authorized the spending increase as a suggestion for Congress, 
which it has yet to institute.158 Moreover, it leaves some of the most effective programs for 
curbing the epidemic, such as oversight and mandatory prescribing practices, as voluntary. It is 
also unlikely that $180 million a year would be adequate to help combat the crisis, considering 
most lawmakers estimate that $920 million would be a more accurate figure.159 Additionally, 
CARA was signed in 2016, and by that point in time the prescription opioid epidemic had 
already given way to the more immediate threat of fentanyl-infused heroin. Therefore, it is likely 
that developing non-opioid painkillers would not really have a visible impact. Again, the 
loopholes in this legislation can be attributed to partisan wrangling.   
Later that year, the 21st Century Cures Act was passed, which authorized $6.3 billion in 
funding over two years, mostly for the NIH, and awarded more than $1 billion in new funding in 
grants to states for opioid-related efforts.160 As it officially awarded the funds laid out in CARA, 
this act is seen as the capstone of the Obama administration’s efforts to increase the federal drug 
treatment budget. Although it is a monumental feat to pass two consecutive years of funding, it is 
important to note that opioid addiction is a chronic condition that usually lasts much longer than 
two years for most of those afflicted with it, and many need long-term, ongoing treatment. 
Considering the current administration’s stance and the Republican-held Congress, it is unlikely 
that this funding had a dramatic effect at all, and it seems as though it was more of a Band-Aid or 
quick fix than a long-term, sustainable effort to curb opioid addiction.  
Obama’s change in rhetoric regarding addiction and his successful restructuring of the 
health care system have clearly had a substantial effect on addicts. Throughout his two terms, 
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President Obama dramatically increased public health spending for anti-drug efforts and 
proposed the first drug control budget since President Carter that would spend more funding on 
treatment and prevention than law enforcement and interdiction programs.161 Additionally, 
between 2008 and 2016, the federal government’s demand-reduction budget grew from $9.1 
billion to $15.1 billion, and overall the drug treatment budget nearly doubled from $7.2 billion to 
$14.2 billion.162 Furthermore, in a more symbolic action, Obama appointed a new drug czar in 
2016, Michael Botticelli, the first person to hold the position that came from the treatment side of 
drug policy as opposed to law enforcement in the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s 
history. However, it is also important to note that this increase in demand-reduction spending has 
not come at the expense of draconian supply-side policies, which have continued to hold steady 
throughout Obama’s administration and remain today. Overall, the Obama administration 
improved coverage and treatment options for those suffering from addiction and approved some 
funding and resources to individual states combatting the epidemic on their own.  
Trump Administration 
 
 The opioid epidemic and drug policy in general have both been two of President Trump’s 
main policy goals since the start of his campaign. Unlike his predecessor, Trump has reverted 
back to the War on Drugs era rhetoric. He ran on a “tough on crime” platform, a strategy which 
has been adopted by his top officials, including Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who has 
promised a swift return to a “law and order” form of criminal justice policy, as he believes that 
“being soft on sentencing means more violent crime.”163 This type of policy approach is 
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disturbing not only because of the decades of evidence which shows that supply-side focused 
policies do not work, but it is particularly dangerous due to the current severity of the opioid 
epidemic. Furthermore, Trump’s federal drug control agencies, including the DEA and ONDCP, 
are not coordinated with his goals, with one former House member calling the opioid 
commission “and the administration’s other efforts to address the epidemic tantamount to 
reshuffling chairs on the Titanic.”164 At a time when the opioid epidemic is at its most critical 
point, the Trump administration is promoting a policy approach that is known to be ineffective, 
and has shifted the policy making power away from federal drug policy agencies to the executive  
branch.  
One of the only steps Trump has taken so far that has been viewed in a positive light was 
his official declaration of the opioid crisis as a public health emergency on October 26, 2017. 
However, while the public address did draw national attention to the epidemic, it was largely 
symbolic. This is due to the fact that he refused to declare it a national emergency, which would 
have freed up millions in federal funding.165 In a more concrete and legitimate action, Trump 
signed the Interdict Act in January 2017, which will provide federal agents with additional tools 
for detecting fentanyl and other synthetic opioids at Mexican border.166 While this act is a 
supply-side solution, the effective monitoring of opioids, especially fentanyl, is a necessary 
component of the national drug policy strategy that cannot be overlooked. In terms of demand-
side policies, Trump recently signed an executive order that waives a 1960s-era policy which 
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blocked Medicaid payments to inpatient treatment facilities with more than 16 substance-abuse 
beds, which should make treatment more widely available.167 These policies constitute the only 
efforts of the administration thus far that have had any effect in combating the epidemic.  
An initiative implemented by the Trump administration that has not been met with such 
enthusiasm was his creation of an “opioid cabinet,” which has now been tasked with leading the 
policy coordination with agencies such as the DEA, ONDCP, and the already established opioid 
commission. The cabinet is headed by Kellyanne Conway, Trump’s former campaign manager 
with no public health or drug policy background. Even more concerning, a report from February 
2018 from Politico stated that Conway and her staff’s main response to the crisis plaguing the 
nation has been to plan a “just say no” campaign and promote the construction of a border wall 
with Mexico.168 Conway has practically taken control of the opioids agenda, and has effectively 
pushed out the ONDCP, the opioid commission, and other drug policy officials by systematically 
excluding them from decision-making meetings.169 This unprecedented concentration of policy 
power in this executive “cabinet” illustrates Trump’s incompetence in creating a real solution for 
the opioid crisis – whether it is going to be a “tough on crime one” or not – as the opioid cabinet 
has yet to come up with a comprehensive response of any kind. 
The formation of the opioid cabinet has had severely negative effects on the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the federal agency that is charged with creating and 
controlling the budget for national drug policies. It also assists the State Department and DEA in 
dealing with source country interdiction, provides public health and law enforcement officials 
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with grants and training, and produces the National Drug Control Strategy, an annual blueprint 
for drug policy.170 The ONDCP director, known as the “drug czar,” is supposed to act as the 
president’s main advisor on issues relating to illicit drugs, ranging from manufacturing, 
smuggling, and addiction.171 In essence, the ONDCP has historically been the lead policy 
advising agency for the federal government in terms of drug strategy.  
Not only has Trump essentially replaced the ONDCP with his opioid cabinet, but he has 
yet to appoint a drug czar. His original nominee, Representative Tom Marino, withdrew his 
name in October after reports linked his support to a bill that would have limited the DEA’s 
ability to investigate abuses by opioid manufacturers and distributors.172 Since then, he has failed 
put forth another candidate, which many view as a tactic to keep the ONCDP out of the drug 
policy process. As of now, the United States main drug policy office is being led by a 24-year 
old Trump campaign worker, Taylor Weyeneth. Weyeneth has no previous experience in drug 
policy, and his ascent from a low-level post to deputy chief of staff is in large part due to staff 
turnover vacancies.173 His quick rise provides insight into the administration’s incompetence and 
the troubled future state of the ONDCP.  
Similar to the ONDCP’s current position, the opioid commission’s recommendations 
have also been sidelined by the Trump administration and its opioid cabinet. The opioid 
commission was created by an executive order, and was supposed to advise Trump on ways to 
effectively combat the epidemic.174 In its October 2017 final report, it called for expanding the 
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capacity for drug treatment under Medicaid, increasing the use of MATs, mandating that every 
local law enforcement officer carry naloxone, creating more drug courts, creating block grants of 
substance abuse aid for cities and states, and mandating providers to check PDMPs.175 Notably 
absent from this report, of course, are the supply-side based, tough-on-crime measures that 
Trump and Sessions have offered up as solutions, such as building “the wall” and expanding the 
use of mandatory minimums for low-level drug crimes. The commission was disbanded in 
December 2017, and virtually none of its recommendations, written by some of the leading drug 
policy and addiction treatment specialists in the nation, have yet to be taken into consideration. 
Again, one can see the disconnect between the rhetoric and policies put forth between the Trump 
administration and the federal drug agencies and commissions.  
 In contrast with the policies Trump is trying to avoid, there are two significant initiatives 
he is pushing to implement that will affect the opioid epidemic, albeit in a negative way. These 
two policies include repealing the ACA, and instituting budgets cuts to demand-side policies and 
increased budget spending for supply-side policies. Trump ran his campaign on the promise of 
an ACA repeal, and although it was not necessarily designed with the opioid epidemic in mind, it 
has provided millions of addicts with expanded access to medical treatment, health insurance 
coverage, and addiction treatment. It is now estimated that over 660,000 Americans who suffer 
from opioid use disorders are now covered under the ACA Medicaid expansion.176 Therefore, if 
the ACA is repealed, these people will automatically lose coverage for all of these essential 
health benefits, and many of these lifesaving treatments will be out of reach yet again. Small, 
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mostly white, rural communities throughout the Midwest, many of which have been hit the 
hardest the epidemic, will also be affected to the greatest extent by such a repeal. For example, in 
West Virginia, one of the most devastated states, nearly half of the funding the state uses to 
combat the crisis comes from Medicaid.177 Moreover, in 2015, the fifteen counties with the 
highest mortality from opioid-related overdoses were all located in Kentucky and West Virginia, 
both of which took the Medicaid expansion.178 Although the first attempt to repeal the ACA was 
not successful, there will likely be future attempts by the administration, which would 
immediately revoke coverage for over half a million addicts struggling with an opioid addiction. 
Lastly, the outline of Trump’s 2019 fiscal year budget embodies the administration’s 
draconian, punitive, and “law and order” based approach to drug policy that is alarmingly 
reminiscent of the War on Drugs era in the late 1980s and early 1990s. An outline of the 
proposals released from the White House Office of Management and Budget shows that the 
president intends to give $10 billion in 2019 to the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services for demand-side policies, such as treatment, recovery, mental health, and prevention 
programs for opioid users.179 While this seems like a substantial amount, it is quite small 
compared to the combined $44 billion he plans to use on infrastructure spending for his wall and 
border security priorities.180 Again, one can see how the American government has yet to grapple 
with the origins and lasting systems put in place by the drug war, and the Trump administration 
is only continuing to proliferate its failed supply-side policies. 
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 Drug policy has historically been a federal policy domain. However, the stalemate, 
incompetency, and outright incorrect policy direction of the current administration demonstrates 
why states and localities might be the best levels of government for combating the opioid 
epidemic in terms of demand-side solutions. President Trump’s response to the 115 Americans 
dying every day from an opioid-related overdose is to simply teach kids that “there is nothing 
desirable about drugs. They’re bad. Maybe talking to youth and telling them [drugs] are no good, 
really bad for you, in every way” will work. Given the lack of a detailed plan, it seems basically 
implausible that a coherent, comprehensive drug policy will be put in place any time soon.181 
Considering this type of rhetoric, it is important going forward to note that the state and local 
levels, whose public health officials, law enforcement officers, and community groups are 
confronted directly with the crisis every day, have embraced the effectiveness of using both 
supply-side and demand-side policies to effectively counteract this ongoing epidemic.  
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Chapter IV: State and Local Supply-Side and Demand-Side Policies 
“Some people might argue that the widespread distribution of a safe, effective, and inexpensive 
antidote might actually encourage drug use. But that’s like suggesting that air bags and seatbelts 
encourage unsafe driving” – Robert S. Hoffman, Emergency Physician 
 
I. Introduction 
 Unlike the responses, or lack thereof, at the federal level, state and local governments 
have begun to enact their own comprehensive and appropriate strategies to combat the opioid 
epidemic. The War on Drugs’ supply-side policies had many long-lasting, detrimental 
consequences, such as the militarization of state and local police, mass incarceration, and a 
considerable fiscal impact on the federal government.182 However, as mentioned throughout this 
thesis, diminishing the supply of any type of drug is still an important piece of the supply and 
demand puzzle, albeit not the only one. On the other hand, the demographics of the population 
now most severely affected by the epidemic, the “scourge of white, working-class Americans 
from the Midwest to New England,” is changing the perception of how an epidemic of addiction 
should be addressed.183 Recently, states and localities have taken a more active role in 
implementing demand-side policies, in particular treatment, rehabilitation, and prevention.184 
Yet, in the same way that strictly supply-side policies are inadequate on their own, so are 
demand-side policies. While reducing the “demand” for drugs (the addicted users), is of course 
the primary goal in combatting any addiction epidemic, due to the cheap availability and wide 
accessibility of heroin and other synthetic opioids, sufficient supply-side policies must also be 
employed. In that light, the purpose of this chapter is to evaluate several supply-side and 
                                                        
182 Refer back to Chapter 1, page 19.  
183 “Inside the Opioid Epidemic: Deaths from the Drugs Say More About Markets than About White Despair,” The 
Economist, May 11, 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21721960-deaths-drugs-say-more-about-
markets-about-white-despair-inside-opioid. 
184 Stephen Barlas, “U.S. and States Ramp Up Response to Opioid Crisis,” Pharmacy and Therapeutics Peer-
Reviewed Journal 42, no. 9 (September 2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5565130/. 
Librett 65 
 
demand-side policies that have been implemented on the state or local level, and provide 
evidence to support their efficacy, in order to draw conclusions about the most successful 
strategies that are currently available for combatting the opioid crisis. 
 
II. Supply-Side Policies  
 The second wave of the opioid epidemic is fueled by heroin, specifically fentanyl-infused 
heroin, both of which are illegal and carry high social risks for users. Therefore, reducing their 
supplies through effective enforcement, interdiction, production control, and other criminal 
justice or law enforcement approaches is of the outmost importance. While the federal 
government and its agencies, such as the DEA and FBI, have more authority over interdiction 
strategies and production control, in the wake of the crisis state and local governments are 
beginning to take action in terms of criminal justice or other law enforcement policies. State 
prescribing limits for opioid painkillers have been some of the most popular supply-side policies 
implemented on the state level.185 However, fentanyl-adulterated heroin is now the most urgent 
hazard to states and localities, as it no longer constitutes a “situation of isolated outbreaks, but a 
major sustained public health challenge.”186 Consequently, they are beginning to institute several 
innovative and effective supply-side strategies that are worthy of mention. Although some are in 
line with the Trump administration’s “tough on crime” mantra and reversion back to the failed 
War on Drugs policies, for the most part states and localities are employing responsive and 
suitable supply-side solutions that have been significantly reducing the amount of illicit heroin 
and fentanyl available in their communities.   
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Florida 
 Florida has perhaps been the most aggressive in taking a “tough on crime” approach to 
the opioid crisis that in many ways parallels the response on the federal level. In July of 2017, 
Governor Rick Scott signed House Bill 477 into law, a controlled substances act that imposed a 
three-year mandatory minimum for fentanyl and its derivatives. Florida’s Attorney General Pam 
Bondi was one of the main lobbyists behind this provision, declaring that “[the bill] is going to 
get these monsters off the streets for three years while we can clean this problem up throughout 
our country.”187  Most drug policy experts are skeptical about the institution of a mandatory 
minimum sentence for fentanyl trafficking. Historically, laws that set “mandatory prison time for 
arbitrary possession amounts have been shown to capture both addicts and poor minorities in 
cycles of imprisonment and poverty… have done little to decrease usage levels… and have not 
deterred drug trafficking at all.”188 Addressing the new threat of fentanyl within the criminal 
justice system is of paramount importance, but imposing mandatory minimums in an already 
extremely punitive state system might not prove to be the most viable option.  
Part of the reason that Florida is one of the few states enacting this type of draconian 
approach to drug policy is due to the structure of its state legislature. Florida is one of fifteen 
states were lawmakers have term limits, which “philosophically fits the state’s conservative 
aversion to lifelong politicians, but practically it means lawmakers have less institutional 
knowledge and often leave before they see the effects of their actions.”189 The consequences of 
these limits are reflected in the fact that throughout the past few decades, Florida’s criminal 
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justice system has increasingly become one of the most punitive systems in the country. By 
2010, it’s incarceration rate was 38% higher than the national average, and by 2012, almost half 
of the 32,555 inmates were repeat offenders, many of whom were arrested for drug crimes.190 
These statistics highlight the popular opinion that punitive policies, such as mandatory 
minimums, do not discourage people from committing crimes or lower recidivism rates. 
Moreover, there were 5,725 opioid-related deaths in Florida in 2016, a 35% increase from 
2015.191 Again, one can see that harsh punishments for drug crimes have not had a sizeable effect 
on the availability or price of opioids, as the overdose rates continue to rise. Lastly, a study 
commissioned by the state found that Florida’s prison system provided core treatment to a mere 
14% of inmates, many of whom struggle with addiction.192 Florida compares poorly to other 
states in terms of mental health and substance abuse funding per capita, which can be mostly 
attributed to this heavy focus on incarceration. For example, Florida’s 2017 fiscal budget 
included an $11 million reduction in mental health and substance abuse funding.193 Not only has 
this “tough on crime” approach failed on both the federal and state levels to reduce the supply of 
opioids to any degree, but it has also had negative consequences for the addicts who get caught 
up in the system. Therefore, mandatory minimums and other particularly draconian drug war era 
policies should not be taken into serious consideration when it comes to altering drug policy in 
the face of the opioid epidemic. 
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Indiana 
 Like Florida, Indiana has also maintained a “tough on crime” approach that has been 
revived on the federal level by the Trump administration. Mainly, the focus has been on 
incarcerating drug traffickers, specifically those who sell heroin and fentanyl. In May 2017, 
Governor Eric Holcomb’s Drug Prevention Treatment and Enforcement Task Force released a 
multi-faceted “Preliminary Action Plan” to tackle the crisis via treatment, strategic law 
enforcement, and “community-based collaborations.”194 Even so, a tension remains between the 
Governor’s office and the state’s prosecutors, who are for the most part vehemently opposed to 
any medical approach to treatment, such as Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT). In general, 
prosecutors, and district attorneys in particular, are opposed to criminal justice reform because it 
diminishes some of their authority over determining what sentences will be imposed on those 
convicted of drug crimes. The president of the Association of Indiana’s Prosecuting Attorneys 
(AIPA), Patricia Baldwin, recently argued that “penalties for drug possession and drug dealing 
are too low,” and that the task force’s comprehensive plan does not provide “a comparable and 
equivalent improvement on the enforcement side.”195 The power struggle between the Governor 
and the state prosecutors is a familiar story that began in the drug war era, as prosecutors are 
usually one of the driving forces behind the implementation of destructive punitive policies, such 
as mandatory minimums. 
 This conflict can also be seen between Indiana’s state legislature and its prosecutors. In 
2013, the state legislature passed House Bill 1006, which “decrease[d], from a felony to a 
misdemeanor, possession of a scheduled controlled substance.”196 One of the primary objectives 
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behind this type of reform was to reduce the number of people convicted of low-level, nonviolent 
drug crimes in state prisons for both fiscal and ethical reasons. Another goal was to subsequently 
secure treatment options for the low and medium-level offenders. Thus, the successful passage of 
this bill was seen as a necessary initial action in redacting some of the punitive policies for low-
level drug crimes instituted in the drug war era that have negatively affected many addicts. 
In May 2017, Baldwin released another statement that called for a more drastic law enforcement 
approach to solving the opioid epidemic, and “slammed [the] legislator’s decision to reform 
Indiana’s criminal code.”197 Additionally, she contended that the changes “curb [prosecutors and 
law enforcement’s] ability to address rampant opioid use and believe the task force’s proposal is 
doomed to fail without their help.”198 Indiana’s draconian, law enforcement-based policies that 
were instituted in the War on Drugs era persist today, despite efforts by the Governor and state 
legislature to correct them. 
Maine 
 Alongside Florida and Indiana, Maine has also attempted to toughen its penalties for drug 
traffickers. However, instead of relying on the older mandatory minimum framework or 
essentially deferring to state prosecutors to implement policy, the state legislature has developed 
new laws that specifically address the threat of fentanyl. Because fentanyl is extremely potent, 
even small amounts equivalent to a few grains of salt can prove deadly. Additionally, compared 
to more traditional methods of opioid administration, such as intravenous use, it can be easily 
inhaled or absorbed through the skin. This poses an extreme risk not only for the users, but to the 
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bystanders, first responders, law enforcement officials, and medical professionals who are often 
present during overdoses.199 Consequently, Maine’s state legislature passed 17-A MRSA § 1101 
in 2017, which: 
Makes it a trafficking offense to possess 2 or more grams of fentanyl powder or 
90 or more individual bags, folds, packages, envelopes, or containers of any kind 
containing fentanyl powder. Makes it an offense to “furnish” controlled 
substances by possession of 2 grams or more of fentanyl powder or at least 45,  
but fewer than 90 individual bags, folds, packages, envelopes, or containers of 
any kind containing fentanyl powder. Defines "fentanyl powder" as any compound, 
mixture or preparation, in granular or powder form, containing fentanyl.200 
 
While it is too early to study the effects of this legislation, it is important to note because it 
represents a new type of legislation that is designed specifically to address the trafficking of 
fentanyl. Unlike cocaine or even heroin itself, fentanyl’s high level of potency means that 
miniscule amounts have the capacity to cause extremely high rates of overdoses and overdose 
fatalities. Consider this: a mere 2 milligrams of fentanyl are enough to cause an overdose 
fatality.201 An envelope, a common vessel for trafficking, can hold around 2 grams of fentanyl.202 
This means that one envelope of fentanyl has the potential to kill over 1,000 people. Therefore, 
laws that take fentanyl’s unique properties and dangers into account will most likely prove more 
effective in deterring the trafficking of the drug than a one-size-fits-all mandatory minimum.  
California 
 More than any other state, California has taken the most active role in instituting criminal 
justice reforms that are in direct contrast with the “tough on crime” response on the federal and 
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some state levels. California is one of the most populous states that incorporated drug war 
policies into its own state system, and now boasts the second highest prison population in the 
country, totaling 129,536 prisoners as of March 2018.203 The correlation between War on Drugs 
policies and high prison rates began to be noticed by the mid-2000s, which subsequently led to 
drastic criminal justice reforms in California. Interestingly, many of these changes have been 
introduced as propositions, as opposed to bills put forth by the state legislature. Propositions are 
referendums or initiative measures that are submitted to the electorate for a direct decision or 
direct vote either by the state legislature, or more commonly, via a petition signed by registered 
voters.204  
  In terms actual reform, California Proposition 36, passed in 2012, “remove[d] the 
mandatory life sentence for a nonviolent, non-serious offense under the three strikes law.”205 
Moreover, California Proposition 47, passed in 2014, “reduce[d] drug possession from a felony 
to a misdemeanor.”206 Due to their novelty, peer-reviewed studies have yet to be published about 
the efficacy of these propositions in diverting opioid addicts away from the penal system and 
into detoxification or rehabilitation programs. However, both of these reforms have probably 
diminished the likelihood that addicts would be arrested for possession or receive a lifelong 
mandatory sentence. Not only should these types of policies be taken into consideration by other 
states in dire need of criminal justice reform, but the proposition process itself also has 
advantages. Although California employs propositions more than other states, the utilization of 
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citizen action and mobilization to implement successful supply-side solutions should not be 
overlooked when contemplating how these types of policies can be instituted, especially in 
polarized state governments. 
Boone, Campbell, and Kenton Counties, Kentucky 
 While the state level provides a useful channel to enact practical supply-side solutions, 
the strategies implemented on the local, city, and county levels should not be underestimated in 
terms of their creativity and effectiveness. The concept of regional cooperation is “perhaps the 
most important in law enforcement, given that drug trafficking often cuts across local lines, 
whether [it be] through formal task forces or less formal regular meetings.”207 An example of a 
successful regional formal task force is the Northern Kentucky Drug Strike Force. This Strike 
Force was founded through an inter-local agreement between Boone, Campbell, and Kenton 
counties in an attempt to pool their resources and foster cooperation between their police 
agencies and community groups.208 The agency is “charged with the responsibility of 
investigating, apprehending, and prosecuting those involved in the illicit use and distribution of 
controlled substances, as well as, disrupting and/or dismantling drug trafficking 
organizations.”209 The Strike Force achieves these goals through undercover surveillance, 
undercover police buys, and in-depth, cooperative investigations based on intelligence gained 
from all three of the counties.210 Since the 1980s, the agency has continued to expand, acquire 
data and information from each of the counties, and provide efficient drug enforcement.  
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 The Strike Force offers both undercover narcotics and on-site training. The undercover 
narcotics training consists of “on the job training,” where the police officers learn about the most 
important aspects of undercover drug operations, including surveillance (both physical and 
electronic), controlled buy planning and execution, and search warrant application, planning, and 
execution.211 The on-site training is provided for agencies that request guidance in a specific area 
of narcotics investigation, and mainly includes training on methamphetamine and heroin labs, 
and teaches common methods of drug abuse, packing, and trafficking.212 While there are other 
similar formal task forces around the country, the Northern Kentucky Drug Strike Force is 
particularly noteworthy due to the newly implemented state legislation that focuses on the supply 
reduction and enforcement of heroin and fentanyl. Like Maine’s new laws, mandatory minimums 
are not included, and most of the legislation specifically targets fentanyl trafficking. For 
example, the Kentucky state legislature passed KRS § 218A 1412 in June 2017, which:  
Prohibits trafficking of fentanyl. Provides that a person is guilty of trafficking 
in a controlled substance in the first degree when he or she knowingly and  
unlawfully traffics any quantity of heroin, fentanyl, carfentanil, or fentanyl  
derivatives. A first offense is a class C felony and a second offense is a class B  
felony. Requires an offer to serve at least 50% of their sentence.213  
 
This act is a significant policy because it clearly defines that the trafficking of heroin, fentanyl, 
and its synthetic derivatives as a serious drug crime that, at least for the duration of the opioid 
epidemic, is going to be treated differently than other drug crimes. Another important bill that 
was passed around the same time was KRS § 218A 142, which: 
Prohibits trafficking in a misrepresented controlled substance. Provides that 
a person is guilty of trafficking in a misrepresented controlled substance  
when he or she knowingly and unlawfully sells or distributes fentanyl,  
carfentanil, or any Schedule I substance while misrepresenting the identity  
of the drug being sold or distributed as a legitimate pharmaceutical product, 
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which is a Class D felony.214   
 
This act is also important not only because fentanyl has become infused into heroin supplies, but 
it has also started to appear in counterfeit opioid painkillers that are sold on the street. Before this 
act was passed, a state law that explicitly addressed this issue did not exist. Again, while it is too 
early to provide any concrete evidence about the efficacy of these laws, it is extremely likely that 
by clarifying how charges related to heroin, fentanyl, and their derivatives should be charged, 
drug task forces like the Strike Force can operate more effectively.  
High Point County, North Carolina 
 Another pioneering supply-side solution for the opioid epidemic that has been 
implemented on the county level is the Drug Market Intervention (DMI) strategy. DMI was 
started in High Point County, North Carolina in 2004, and has since spread to dozens of other 
cities and counties all over the country. Overt drug markets, which are drug markets that operate 
openly in public, obviously create dangerous and violent risks for communities. Instead of 
focusing solely on the legislation that dictates drug crimes, this program targets overt drug 
markets by engaging directly in communities to identify street-level dealers, arrest violent 
offenders, and develop prosecutable drug cases for nonviolent dealers (but suspends these unless 
the dealer continues dealing), which allows law enforcement to put dealers on notice that any 
future dealing will result in certain, immediate sanctions.215 Unlike many supply-side, criminal 
justice solutions or reforms, DMI not only brings together legislators and law enforcement 
officials, but also those committing the crimes – the dealers themselves. It even provides sit-
down meetings between the dealers, their families, police officers, social service providers, and 
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community leaders to make clear that the drug sales must end.216 That partnership “tells dealers 
clearly and directly that the community cares about them but rejects their behavior, that help is 
available, and that continued dealing will result in immediate consequences through the 
activation of existing cases.”217 By taking a community approach to drug market intervention, 
this strategy is unlike others in the fact that it brings together everyone involved in drug crime in 
order to curb the supply of drugs. 
 The foundational principle at the core of DMI is the deterrence theory, which holds that 
humans are rational beings who consider the consequences of their actions, and are deterred from 
engaging in continual patterns of offending as a result of the certainty, severity, and celerity of 
punishment.218 Because DMI enables law enforcement officials to come in direct contact with 
street-level drug dealers, and dissuade them away from dealing by offering a suspension on their 
sentences, they are often successful in deterring drug dealing. A study by the National Network 
for Safe Communities at John Jay College found that DMI reduced the amount of drug offenses 
in Nashville by 55%, in High Point by 44-56%, and the amount of non-violent offenses in 
Rockford by 22%.219 While this strategy has proven successful in diminishing the influence of 
overt drug markets in certain communities, the opioid epidemic provides a unique challenge 
because, in general, opioids are sold through covert markets, as “people are not standing out on 
street corners selling opioids or operating flagrant drug houses.”220 However, a study of the DMI 
strategy in Rutland, Vermont demonstrated that officials were still able to identify dealers and 
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“developed an enforcement and maintenance strategy to permanently shut down each layer of 
participation in the market… between 20 to 25 out-of-state volume distributors and violent 
dealers [eventually] faced federal charges.” 221 Rutland’s DMI effort has not been formally 
evaluated yet, however, this preliminary research noted some positive effects, including a 17% 
reduction in overall crime in the city after the program was implemented, and a decrease in drug-
related deaths between 2013 and 2015.222 These findings suggest that DMI may hold promise as 
a successful supply-side policy solution that can target the covert opioid market directly.   
 
III. Demand-Side Policies 
 In addition to the supply-side policies outlined above, several innovative demand-side 
approaches have also been implemented on the state and local levels. For the purpose of this 
chapter, demand-side policies refer to any harm-reduction policies, treatment, education, or 
prevention programs that are put in place to reduce the number of drug users.223 Specifically, 
harm-reduction policies are strategies, programs, and practices that aim to diminish the harms 
directly associated with the use of psychoactive drugs in people unwilling or unable to stop.224 
Since 1990, there has been a “steady rise in the proportion of substance abuse treatment facility 
admissions for heroin abuse as compared to other illicit drugs, as addiction has been increasingly 
rapidly throughout the 2000s… in 1993 the proportion of all admissions reporting heroin as the 
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primary drug was 20%, and by 2003 it was 39%, a 252% increase.”225 These statistics highlight 
why public health officials, addiction specialists, scholars, and policy makers are currently 
reembracing the value of demand-side solutions. Moreover, modern medical research has shifted 
how people think of addiction, which is now generally viewed as a chronic disease that is 
receptive to treatment, and “requires a long-term approach with Medication-Assisted Therapies 
(MAT), counseling support, and similar means to assist with psychosocial challenges.”226 In 
effect, states and localities are instituting comprehensive, public health approaches that aim to 
diminish the “demand” for opioids, by creating increased access to treatment, rehabilitation, 
harm-reduction, and prevention programs. 
San Francisco, California 
 As previously mentioned, California has taken a number of measures to improve how its 
criminal justice system treats drug offenders. Additionally, cities throughout the state have begun 
to implement harm-reduction solutions that have been successful in reducing the many harms 
associated with opioid use, such as the transmission of deadly diseases and an increasing 
likelihood of an overdose fatality. San Francisco was one of the first cities to pilot one of these 
programs, the DOPE Project, which was founded by California’s Department of Public Health as 
a “Harm Reduction Coalition” in 1993.227 One of its main strategies includes a syringe access 
program, which provides a place where users can use drugs safely and exchange their used 
needles for clean ones without fear of criminal punishment. This program, the Syringe Access 
Collaborative (SAC), “is an essential component in the prevention of HIV and hepatitis C among 
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people who inject drugs, [as] research consistently demonstrates this effectiveness in preventing 
[the] transmission of infectious disease and skin and soft tissue infections, while also supporting 
the overall health and well-being of the drug users from linkages to drug treatment, medical care, 
housing, and overdose prevention.”228 Even though programs like SAC do not necessarily reduce 
the overall usage of opioids, they are successful in diminishing the harms associated with that 
use. From a community-based perspective, this type of initiative is starting to become more 
normalized due to the growing recognition that addiction is a disease, and that addicts should be 
protected from the risks associated with their use until they are able, or willing, to get help.  
Another modern harm-reduction approach supported by the DOPE Project is the 
introduction of fentanyl test strips into the drug-using community. The Fentanyl Test Strip Pilot 
program was launched in August 2017 in response to the sudden appearance of fentanyl in San 
Francisco’s drug supply. It partnered with the SAC to provide strips to San Francisco’s syringe 
access programs throughout the city, funded by the California Department of Public Health.”229 
This program was instituted a few months ago, and thus it is not possible to analyze its 
immediate effects yet. Nevertheless, it is an extremely important policy to consider because most 
heroin users are unaware that their heroin has been mixed with fentanyl, which of course carries 
a much higher risk of an overdose. By providing users with test strips, addicts can test the supply 
they buy and avoid, or at the least be aware, when the heroin has been injected with fentanyl or 
other highly potent synthetic opioids. 
 Perhaps the most important DOPE Project strategy is its distribution of intranasal 
naloxone. In accordance with standing medical orders, in 2010 the DOPE Project started to 
supply naloxone at all San Francisco needle exchange sites, methadone maintenance programs, 
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and other community-based programs.230 Naloxone is an effective antidote for opioid overdoses 
due to its pharmacological properties. Once administered, “it promptly reverses the biological 
effects that are caused by heroin, reversing the respiratory suppression caused by opioids and 
consequently reversing the fatal opioid overdose.231 Due to the pervasiveness of fentanyl in San 
Francisco’s heroin supply, this is a crucial policy that should be taken into serious consideration 
by every locality or state severely affected by the opioid epidemic. Although part of the Obama 
administration’s opioid initiative was to expand access to naloxone, “there remains considerable 
debate amongst clinicians, policy makers, and researchers about whether providing education 
and naloxone kits does in fact save lives or instead discourages treatment and causes harm (by 
reducing interactions with emergency health care providers and/or encouraging risky 
behaviors).”232 While this is a valid concern, the results of this initiative were assessed, and 
reports showed a continuous trend in the reduction of opioid overdose deaths from 1996 to 
2010.233 Providing overdose information, prevention, and response education to drug users, their 
families, friends, communities, and first responders are necessary actions that are needed to 
quickly diminish the number of addicts who experience overdoses and overdose fatalities.  
King County, Washington 
 King County’s Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion Program (LEAD), is one of the 
most well-known harm-reduction programs in the country. Founded in 2011, it seeks to divert 
addicts away from low-level drug crime punishment into treatment services. Specifically, it is a 
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“pre-booking diversion pilot program [that] allows law enforcement officials to redirect low-
level offenders engaged in drug activity to community-based treatment and support services – 
including housing, health care, job training, treatment and mental health support – instead of 
processing them through traditional criminal justice system avenues.”234 The program is funded 
through a collection of private foundations, and is governed by a wide-ranging “group of 
stakeholders… membership of the policy coordinating group includes the mayor, county 
executive, city council, city attorney’s office, county prosecutor, county sheriff, municipal 
police, state corrections department, community groups, and advocates.”235 Not only does this 
coalition reduce the criminal behavior of people who participate in the program, many of whom 
are addicts, but it also subsequently improves the overall public safety within the community. 
Studies so far have evaluated the relative effectiveness of the LEAD program in reducing 
criminal recidivism. In a study conducted in 2015, participants in LEAD were found to be 60% 
less likely than those in the control group to reoffend within the first six months of evaluation.236 
In terms of the opioid epidemic, this is a substantial reduction in the number of people arrested 
for low-level, nonviolent drug crimes, many of whom tend to be “addict dealers” that only sell 
drugs in order to support their own habit. By diverting them away from jail, in which only 15% 
of addicted inmates receive treatment of any kind, users are placed into community-service 
groups and treatment programs.237 This type of program is unique, as it requires the coordination 
between public health officials, city and county representatives, law enforcement agencies, and 
private-sector supporters. While this wide-ranging coalition may seem unlikely to form in other 
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localities, LEAD has shown the viability of a program that has the ability to diminish recidivism 
rates, reduce criminal justice spending, and improve the overall safety of the community. 
Ocean County, New Jersey 
 As previously discussed in the first section of this chapter, often times prosecutors are 
chief supporters of maintaining a “tough on crime” approach in regards to drug policy. However, 
in some cases, prosecutor’s offices have been taking the lead in terms of implementing new and 
creative demand-side approaches. For example, Ocean County’s prosecutor’s office has created a 
new and simple way to communicate the dangers of opioid use through its “funeral cards,” which 
“contain information about the dangers of prescription painkillers [and other opioids] alongside 
instructions for proper disposal of remaining prescriptions. The prosecutor’s office gives these 
cards to funeral directors, who then hand them out to families of deceased individuals.”238 While 
there is no quantitative way to calculate the immediate result of an education-based approach like 
this, public awareness has become an increasingly popular demand-side strategy on the local 
level. When a drug epidemic takes hold of a community, public awareness campaigns that “deter 
new users [from use] are especially effective, as the reduce the pool of “susceptibles,” [those 
who are at the highest risk of using], and deters existing users from transitioning to regular 
use.”239 Educational public awareness campaigns, such as initiatives like this which are funded 
and promoted by the prosecutor’s office, represents an approach that has been designed as a 
direct reaction to the opioid epidemic, as many people are unaware of the immediate threats of 
modern day opioid use.  
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 Another program piloted by the Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office is its Recovery Coach 
Program, an eight week-long voluntary recovery program for opioid overdose addicts. The 
program “connects individuals revived by naloxone with treatment options once they are 
stabilized in the emergency rooms… working with area hospitals, the program matches an 
overdose victim with a recovery coach, who, if the patient agrees, will work with the person and 
help steer him or her towards recovery.”240 What is noteworthy about this program is that the 
coaches are usually in recovery themselves, and their similar experiences and perspectives can 
perhaps be of more use to the addicts new to recovery than public health officials or law 
enforcement officers. Moreover, free or subsidized treatment is available for willing participants, 
in order for their recovery process to continue after the initial eight weeks.241 Overall, the 
program has seen a wide-range of participation, with up to 70% of overdose victims agreeing to 
participate in the program from its onset, which emphasizes the fact that most addicts want 
treatment.242 This community-based, volunteer recovery support service has become an 
increasingly popular public health strategy for counteracting the opioid crisis. Because they are 
“based primarily on shared experiences of addiction and recovery… they can be seen as a bridge 
between formal systems, such as hospitals, specialty substance abuse treatment providers, drug 
courts, or correctional institutions, and natural support in the community such as mutual aid 
groups, family, church, or other groups.”243 Unlike the other demand-side solutions analyzed so 
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far, peer recovery programs that provide former addicts as a resource for those starting out in 
recovery is an often underutilized component of the treatment process. 
Massachusetts 
 In terms of employing practical and comprehensive demand-side strategies, 
Massachusetts has been at the forefront of individual state efforts to combat the opioid epidemic.  
Due to its proximity to New York City, the largest heroin-user market in the northeast, Boston 
consequently has a quite large heroin distribution market and particularly high levels of drug 
availability.244 Moreover, in some areas of the state the degree of heroin purity reaches 95%, 
which exceeds the national average.245 These statistics highlight why Massachusetts has quickly 
become one of the most devastatingly effected states by the opioid crisis. Subsequently, a large 
state-wide response to curb the use of opioids, and in particular, fentanyl-infused heroin, 
followed. In July 2015, Governor Baker’s Opioid Working Group released a list of demand-side 
solutions, including some “bold new strategies,” such as increasing access to MAT (Medication-
Assisted Treatment), utilizing data to identify hotspots, supporting substance use prevention 
education in schools, and increasing naloxone access.246  
Specifically, the expansion of MAT, which “combines psychosocial therapy with careful 
opioid administration [such as buprenorphine, naltrexone, and methadone] remains one of the 
most promising options for curbing opioid abuse.”247 Methadone is often regarded as the “gold 
standard” for treating opioid addiction, however, only 22% of people with an opioid use disorder 
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currently receive this form of specialty treatment.248 The available research shows the increased 
effectiveness of using these medications in not only reducing opioid abuse and opioid-related 
overdose deaths,249 but also criminal activity,250 and infectious disease transmission.251 Along 
with methadone, the FDA’s 2002 approval of buprenorphine made it possible for it to be 
prescribed in both traditional treatment programs and by physicians in their own offices, greatly 
increasing MAT availability for addicts.252 Lastly, Massachusetts’ increased MAT access was 
made possible in part by the state’s approval to take the Medicaid expansion offered through the 
ACA, which as previously discussed, greatly increased the number of addicts who now have the 
option to have MAT costs covered by health insurance.  
 Massachusetts also pioneered an Overdose Education Naloxone Distribution Program 
(OEND), an educational platform in which public health officials, bystanders, addicts, and their 
families, learn how to administer naloxone correctly when encountered with an overdose. 
Participants in the program are trained “to recognize the signs of an overdose, seek help, rescue 
breathe, use naloxone, and stay with the person who is overdosing.”253 A 2013 groundbreaking 
study researched the possible effectiveness of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health’s 
expansion of the state’s OEND programs from 2007 to 2009 in reducing the number of opioid 
overdose fatalities. The participants completed a four hour course, a knowledge test about 
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reducing polysubstance misuse and not using alone, and learned how to properly assemble the 
naloxone device and how it should be administered.254 The results of the study showed that, 
generally, opioid-related death rates decreased in communities that implemented OEND, 
compared with community-year strata with no OEND implementation.255 Thus, this study 
demonstrates that OEND can successfully diminish the number of opioid overdose fatalities by 
providing community members that are most likely to come into contact with someone 
experiencing an overdose with the knowledge and skills necessary to administer naloxone.  
Vermont 
 More so than any other state, Vermont has taken a unique, innovative approach in terms 
of combatting the opioid epidemic through demand-side solutions. By the mid-2000s, along with 
the rest of New England, Vermont was caught up in the second wave of the opioid epidemic. In 
2009, John Brooklyn, an addiction specialist, along with other addiction specialists, health care 
experts, and state government officials noticed that while the state did not have a shortage of 
doctors able to prescribe buprenorphine, many of them did not have the proper training or 
support to deal with the rising rates of addiction and overdoses.256 Subsequently, they launched a 
state-wide program that is modeled after the U.S. health care system – a so-called “hub and 
spoke” framework in which the “hub” refers to the places where someone first entered into 
recovery receives intensive treatment, including initial assessment, care coordination, daily 
methadone or buprenorphine treatment, and therapy services.257 As the addict progresses in their 
recovery, they move into the “spoke” part of the model, where they receive their follow-up care, 
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such as continuing medication and access to therapy. However, instead of coming in daily, they 
are granted some freedom and come in on a weekly, monthly, or even less frequent basis, instead 
of the daily regimen they started under.258 The Vermont state legislature legally authorized the 
model in 2012, and there are now six hubs in ten different locations throughout the state.259  
This holistic, science-based approach spearheaded by addiction specialists themselves is 
now the norm in Vermont in terms of treating chronic opioid addiction. According to figures 
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the drug overdose death rate for 
New England was about 24.6 per 100,000 people in 2015, the highest for any region in the 
country.260 However, Vermont was the only state in New England that was both below the 
regional average of 15.8 per 100,000 people, and below the national average of 16.3 per 100,000 
people.261 These statistics suggest that at least some of the disparity between Vermont and the 
rest of New England lies in the fact that it is the only state to implement this creative “hub and 
spoke” system. Although the “hub and spoke” model was eventually legalized by the Vermont 
legislature, as Brooklyn’s efforts show, legislation is not necessary for these types of programs to 
be put in place, as long as they are led by a coordinated group of addiction specialists and other 
members of the medical field and public health care system. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 An interesting and often nuanced aspect of the policies discussed throughout this chapter 
is that not only have they been implemented on the state, city, and county levels, but they have 
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also popped up in virtually every corner of the United States. Effective demand-side and supply-
side policy solutions have been employed in both red and blue states. Innovative approaches and 
programs have been created in the Northeast, Midwest, and Deep South. Similar treatment 
programs have been piloted in economically prosperous and financially destitute counties. This 
observation emphasizes the fact that the opioid epidemic has affected the entire United States. 
No matter the geographic location, majority political party, economic standing, or specific 
demographics of the state or locality, law enforcement, public health officials, the medical 
community, state legislatures, and even the addicts themselves and their support systems are 
attempting, in some way or another, to combat the epidemic that is tearing their communities 
apart. All of these coalitions are necessary in order to effectively counteract the epidemic, and 
these policy approaches provide some examples of successful ways to do so. It is thus pertinent 
to keep these strategies and solutions in mind when considering how states and localities should 
continue fight the ongoing crisis.  
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Chapter V: Ideal Recommendations  
 
 “In small towns, suburbs, and rural communities all over America, an evolving epidemic of 
addiction and overdose is claiming new victims – part of a toxic cocktail of economic and social 
pressures that’s fraying the social fabric and making it harder and harder for too many 
Americans to live the lives they dream about and deserve” – Hillary Rodham Clinton, National 
Council Conference, 2014 
 
I. Introduction  
 
 This thesis has attempted to place the opioid epidemic within a supply and demand model 
in order to evaluate the efficacy of specific policy solutions in a comprehensible manner. Current 
evidence suggests that “the most effective way to end the current opioid crisis is to take a public 
health approach [demand-side strategies] focused on preventing and treating opioid use disorder 
as a chronic disease, while strengthening law enforcement efforts to address illegal supply chain 
activity [supply-side strategies].”262 There is now a negative connotation associated with federal 
drug policy and drug epidemics, due to the failed War on Drugs policies and the current 
administration’s approach. However, there are some supply-side and demand-side solutions that 
can only be instituted by the federal government. By the same token, there are certain supply-
side and demand-side policies that are better suited for the state and local levels. 
Thus, another framework that the opioid epidemic can be examined through is federalism 
– that is, deciphering which policies are the most likely to be implemented on the local, state, or 
federal levels. The opioid crisis is an extremely time sensitive issue. Due to the heightened risks 
associated with modern-day heroin and fentanyl use, more addicted individuals are dying than 
ever before. Provisional data shows that between May 2016 and May 2017, there has been over a 
17% increase in drug overdoses, most of which were opioid-related.263 Furthermore, a recent 
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report by the White House’s Council of Economic Advisors found that previous estimates of the 
cost of the epidemic “greatly understate” the true value lost – which they approximated to be 
around $504 billion, equivalent to 2.8% of the United States’ GDP in 2015.264 These statistics 
demonstrate the climbing social and economic costs of the opioid epidemic, and underscores the 
importance of implementing supply and demand policies on all levels of government as swiftly 
as possible. Going forward, no word is more important to keep in mind than “coordination.” The 
successful mitigation of the epidemic will have to include cooperation between federal, state, and 
local health care systems, government representatives, law enforcement agencies, public health 
officials, and community groups. Outlined below is a compilation of the most current, evidence-
based solutions that can be utilized in an effective manner. 
 
 
II. Ideal Supply-Side Recommendations 
 
Technically speaking, drug enforcement is a federally mandated policy. However, as 
discussed in Chapter One, the Reagan administration delegated the drug war to the subnational 
levels of government through coercive federal programs that brought significant economic 
incentives. Consequently, state and local police departments became increasingly involved in 
drug law enforcement.265 What amounted from this massive shift in procedure is what can be 
deemed the “federalization of drug policy,” 266  in which supply-side policies (drug enforcement 
practices) became active agenda item on the national, state, and local levels of government. 
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Therefore, supply-side solutions, such as criminal justice reform, law enforcement strategies, 
interdiction, and border control, must take all three levels of government and their respective 
agencies into account. It is crucial, then, to assign policy initiatives to the proper jurisdiction. In 
general, the federal government is the most well equipped to employ supply-side policies due to 
its constitutional authority and control over specialized drug enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, 
because of their relatively new role in drug policy, state and local governments and agencies also 
need to implement or improve their enforcement strategies and criminal justice approaches.  
So far, much of this thesis has been devoted to the argument that the supply-side policies 
introduced in the drug war era have failed to curb drug trafficking and addiction rates to any 
significant degree, and have caused detrimental effects on American society. However, this 
catastrophe was mainly due to the fact that only supply-side solutions were put in place, which 
do not address the steady demand of addicted users throughout the past fifty years. Moreover, the 
scope of strictly supply-side interventions is even more limited due to the presence of 
substitutes.267 Thus, the need for both effective supply-side and demand-side policies is perhaps 
the most important point to take away from this entire project.  
Federal Level Supply-Side Policies  
 
The magnitude of the opioid epidemic has reached global proportions. Unlike the first 
wave of the crisis, which was driven by prescription painkillers manufactured on American soil, 
most of the heroin and fentanyl found in the U.S. today have been illegally trafficked into the 
country. As the availability of prescription opioids plummeted due to the institution of abuse-
deterrent reformulations and state prescribing limits, addicts quickly turned to heroin. 
Consequently, the supply of heroin and fentanyl-infused heroin began to grow in order to meet 
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the new demand. This phenomenon is especially troublesome because although heroin is used by 
a smaller number of people than other major drugs, it is much more deadly. For example, current 
cocaine users outnumbered heroin users by approximately 3.5 times in 2014, but heroin-involved 
overdose deaths were twice those of cocaine.268 Thus, the federal government’s urgent need to 
implement policies to diminish the supply of heroin and fentanyl must be a policy priority. 
Criminal Justice Reform  
 
Before discussing the supply-side policies that the federal government must employ 
outside the United States, it is necessary to evaluate the federal criminal justice system that 
dictates how drug crimes are treated inside the country. As discussed in Chapter One, there are a 
few pieces of key legislation passed during the drug war era that shaped national drug policy in 
an attempt to stem the flow of illicit drugs. The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 had a 
particularly significant role in this process, as it established the federal drug policy under which 
the manufacture, importation, possession, use, and distribution of certain substances is 
regulated.269 The statute created the five Schedules (classifications) of drugs, which depend upon 
the drug’s acceptable medical use and its abuse or dependency potential, with Schedule I being 
the most dangerous.270 Under this act, heroin is classified as a Schedule I drug, and defined as a 
“drug with no currently accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse.”271 Fentanyl is 
classified as a Schedule II drug, and defined as a “drug with a high potential for abuse, with use 
potentially leading to severe psychological or physical dependence.”272 These classifications are 
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important to keep in mind, as the severity of federal trafficking penalties mainly depends on the 
Schedule of the drug. 
Furthermore, the Anti-Abuse Drug Act of 1986 and Violent Crime Control Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 both implemented draconian penalties for drug trafficking. The Anti-
Abuse Act of 1986 instituted the death penalty for major traffickers, life in prison for some 
repeat offenders, far more severe penalties for possession, and new mandatory minimums for 
drug offenses with no intent to sell.273 In a similar fashion, the Violent Crime Control Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 employed the “three strikes” mandatory life sentence for repeat 
offenders.274 A direct effect of this legislation is that as of 2016, 47% of all federal prisoners 
were imprisoned for drug offenses, and of those drug offenses, 99% were for drug trafficking.275  
An unintended consequence of these laws that is highlighted by these statistics is that many 
prisoners are incarcerated for low-level, nonviolent drug crimes, instead of high-level drug 
trafficking offenses. 
With that being said, two modifications to federal drug trafficking penalties include 
eliminating mandatory minimums for drug offenses with no intent to sell, and decreasing the 
possession of a controlled substance from a felony to a misdemeanor. Abolishing the mandatory 
minimum would allow judges to have more discretion over individual cases, and would likely 
result in fewer convictions of low-level, nonviolent offenders, many of whom need treatment. 
Furthermore, because misdemeanors are considered a “lesser” criminal act than felonies, they are 
punished less severely and usually result in monetary fines instead of prison time.276 Not only is 
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treating possession of a controlled substance as a felony extremely punitive, but it is also 
counterintuitive because it has resulted in many addicts ending up in federal prison instead of 
treatment. Lastly, it is likely that the diversion of these addicts into treatment instead of prison 
would help curb the extremely high rates of mass incarceration in the United States.  
Another criminal justice reform that needs to be implemented on the federal level is a 
specific penalty for fentanyl trafficking. On November 9th, 2017, the Department of Justice 
announced a policy that is somewhat in line with this recommendation. This DEA policy 
declares that “anyone who possesses, imports, distributes, or manufactures any illicit analogue 
will be subject to criminal prosecution in the same manner as for fentanyl and other controlled 
substances.”277 In other words, this order temporarily classifies all fentanyl analogues as 
Schedule II drugs. Thus, the order makes it easier for federal prosecutors to prosecute traffickers 
for all fentanyl-related substances, as it classifies them all in the same Schedule.278 The only 
weakness of this policy is that it constitutes a temporarily scheduling, which means that it will 
only last up to two years.279 It is unlikely that the supply of fentanyl and its analogues will be 
completely eradicated within two years, and thus a more permanent form of this policy needs to 
be implemented. In light of the previous discussion, model drug laws at the federal level include: 
(1) Elimination of Mandatory Minimum Reform Act: 
To eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for all drug offenses.280 
(2) Drug Possession Reform Act:  
To reduce drug possession from a felony to a misdemeanor.”281 
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(3) Illicit Fentanyl Analogue Scheduling Act: 
Makes any illicit fentanyl analogue a Schedule II drug. Provides that anyone 
who possess, imports, distributes, or manufactures any illicit fentanyl 
analogue will be subject to criminal prosecution in the same manner as for 
fentanyl and other controlled substances.282 
 
Law Enforcement Strategies 
 
The authority and size of federal drug enforcement agencies are very broad, considering 
that the DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency)283, FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation)284, ICE 
(U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)285, and CBP (Customs and Border Protection)286 
all play some role in federal drug enforcement, and combined total over 128,000 personnel and a 
$29 billion annual budget. Therefore, coordination between these agencies, alongside state and 
local law enforcement departments, is necessary to curtail the supply of opioids entering the U.S. 
This “all hands on deck” approach is exemplified by High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 
(HIDTA) programs, which provide “assistance to federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies operating in areas determined to be critical drug trafficking areas.”287 This grant 
program is administered by the ONDCP, and there are currently twenty-eighty active HIDTAs 
throughout the country, covering nearly 18% of all counties and 66% of the population.288 The 
HIDTAs are national programs that are funded by a federal entity, the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy (ONDCP), and run by a federal agency, the DEA. This effort illustrates how 
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coordination among all three levels of government facilitates achieving the common goal of 
diminishing the supply of drugs that fuel the epidemic. For example, at the local level, HIDTAs 
are directed by Executive Boards composed of an equal number of federal and non-federal law 
enforcement leaders.289 These programs have become so widespread that prominent state-level 
organizations, such as the National Governors Association, recommend that “wherever possible, 
[states should] designate HIDTAs as the central source for state drug intelligence.”290 While 
HIDTAs already exist all over the country, more need to be established in particularly affected 
communities that are not currently benefitting from this type of program.  
Interdiction 
 
 Due to the high potency, availability, and inexpensiveness of fentanyl, transnational 
criminal organizations are increasingly utilizing the synthetic opioid as a filler for heroin. 
Moreover, synthetic opioids are now a significant contributor to opioid-related deaths in the 
U.S., evidenced by the fact that out of the 33,091 opioid overdose deaths reported in 2015, 9,580 
were caused by fentanyl or fentanyl-related substances, a 72.2% increase from the previous 
year.291 Thus, the ability of federal drug enforcement agencies to use interdiction, the 
interception of illegal drugs smuggled by air, sea, or land, is a crucial component of federal 
supply-side strategy.292 Since China and Mexico are the two main source countries for illicit 
fentanyl smuggled into the U.S., interdiction measures must be focused mainly on these 
nations.293 A possible challenge posed by interdiction is that the effective curtailment of a supply 
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from one country might lead to another one picking up where the original country left off. For 
example, Nixon’s 1973 major interdiction effort, Operation Intercept, successfully curbed the 
supply of opium and marijuana from entering the United States through Mexico, only to have 
Colombia quickly replace Mexico as the United States’ main supplier.294 However, this type of 
situation can be avoided if interdiction is coupled with demand-side strategies that can 
simultaneously decrease the demand for drugs.  
 In January of 2017, President Trump signed the Interdiction Act, which provides federal 
agents with additional tools for detecting fentanyl and other synthetic opioids at the Mexican 
border.295 These resources include granting the CBP access to the latest chemical screening 
devices that can detect and intercept synthetic opioids, which could be hidden in packages, mail, 
or on travelers themselves.296 Considering that fentanyl is packaged and transported in extremely 
small doses, this is an important policy to implement. While this policy should be regarded as 
one of the few logical supply-side solutions put forth by the Trump administration thus far, a 
challenge to these supply-reduction policies that has surfaced over the past decade is the use of 
technology, specifically the Internet, for drug trafficking. Known colloquially as the “Internet of 
Dope,”297 transnational drug trafficking crime organizations use this tactic to widely expand their 
customer base. Recent reports from the DEA show that in particular, China-based trafficking 
organizations have been using the Internet to globally distribute fentanyl, fentanyl-related 
substances, and synthetic opioids.298 Traditional interdiction methods do not suffice for this type 
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of trafficking that occurs on computer screens. Thus, federal law enforcement agencies need to 
utilize their data and information-sharing networks and surveillance techniques as much as 
possible in order to pinpoint the online activity of these trafficking organizations.  
Border Control 
 
 Because the bulk of illicit heroin and fentanyl arrives in the United States via Mexico and 
Canada, border control is an especially significant federal supply-reduction strategy. The 
southwest Mexican-American border is particularly vulnerable because of the intricate 
infrastructure, proximity, and dominance of Mexican trafficking organizations over the U.S. drug 
trade.299 Over the past few decades, they have maintained territorial influence over large regions 
in Mexico for the cultivation, production, importation, and transportation of illegal drugs, and 
subsequently “[have been] able to introduce multi-ton quantities of illicit drugs into the United 
States on a yearly basis.”300 The majority of these illegal drugs are smuggled into the U.S. over 
land by vehicles, and other traditional methods such as the use of backpackers on land trails that 
cross remote areas of the border.301 Therefore, the vigilant enforcement of this area is crucial in 
diminishing the supply of heroin and fentanyl that is entering the U.S. through this route. 
 One such program is the Southwest Border Initiative (SWBI), a cooperative unit that 
consists of the DEA, FBI, ICE, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Attorney’s offices. The SWBI 
was put in place in order to combat the threat posed by the Mexico-based trafficking groups 
operating along the Southwest border, by targeting the communication systems of their 
command and control centers.302 This multi-faceted strategy allows for these federal agencies to 
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efficiently track drug trafficking as it flows from Mexico into the United States. Since its 
inception in 1994, three of these operations have culminated in the arrest of 156 individuals and 
the seizure of over 22,000 kilos of illegal drugs.303 Because most of the heroin and fentanyl 
driving the opioid epidemic is coming into the U.S. by this route, expanding the program would 
likely have a positive impact in diminishing the amount of these drugs that cross the border.  
Diplomacy and International Engagement with Source Countries 
 
While the national government can impose harsher penalties for high-level fentanyl 
traffickers and the federal drug enforcement agencies can institute stricter interdiction and border 
control policies, it is important to note that source countries’ laws also affect the U.S. drug trade. 
Therefore, diplomatic engagement between the U.S., Mexico, and China is necessary to reduce 
the supply of opioids. Some of these engagements have resulted in annual meetings or events, 
such as the North American Drug Dialogue (NADD), held in October 2016 between the U.S., 
Canada, and Mexico, which focused on the opioid crisis and paid particular attention to heroin 
and illicit fentanyl.304 The U.S. also recently held a NADD technical workshop in which all three 
delegations met for four days of information exchange, and resulted in a list of tangible policies 
for all three countries to implement to address the heroin and fentanyl issue.305 In regards to 
China, following the U.S.’s request for better regulation of Chinese chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries at a number of high-level meetings, China domestically controlled 116 fentanyl 
analogues.306 These examples highlight that international coordination can not only provide a 
system of information exchange, but it can also explicitly change other countries’ drug policies.  
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State Level Supply-Side Policies  
 
 The federal government and its agencies have the broader scope, authority, and resources 
to implement supply-side policies compared to the state or local levels. However, due to the 
federalization of drug policy that occurred during the drug war era, states and localities were 
given the opportunity to expand into the arena of drug policy. Subsequently, most instituted their 
own criminal justice and law enforcement policies devoted specifically to drug enforcement. 
Unfortunately, most states initially followed the national “tough on crime” trend of the time and 
implemented draconian drug laws and strategies throughout the 1980s and 1990s.307 The 
detrimental effects of these policies are reflected in the fact that out of all of the prisoners in the 
United States, around 85% are incarcerated on the state level.308 Moreover, as of 2005, four out 
of five drug arrests on the state level were for possession, while only one in five were for the 
intent to sell.309 Consequently, there is a need for states to reform their punitive drug laws so that 
they are consistent with reform at the federal level. Likewise, the federalization of drug policy 
also thrust state and local law enforcement agencies into an active drug enforcement role that 
transformed them into militarized units.310 Therefore, there is a necessity for both legislative 
modification and law enforcement strategy reform in order to achieve successful implementation 
of supply-side policies on the state and local levels.  
Criminal Justice Reform 
 
 As is recommended at the federal level, one of the of the most important changes to state 
drug laws that should be implemented wherever feasible is the elimination of mandatory 
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minimums. Fortunately, throughout the past decade, nineteen states have made some kind of 
reform to their mandatory minimum laws.311 Considering the examples provided in Chapter 
Four, the discussion below suggests a few model laws that individual states should implement in 
order to both scale back draconian policies that trap addicts in the penal system and also impose 
harsher, more tailored penalties that specifically target the trafficking of fentanyl. Please refer 
back to Chapter Four for detailed explanations of each type of law and why they should be 
implemented on the state level.312  
(1) Elimination of Mandatory Minimum Reform Act: 
To eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for all drug offenses.313 
(2) Fentanyl Trafficking Act:  
Makes it a trafficking offense to possess 2 or more grams of fentanyl powder or 
90 or more individual bags, folds, packages, envelopes, or containers of any kind 
containing fentanyl powder. Makes it an offense to “furnish” controlled 
substances by possession of 2 grams or more of fentanyl powder or at least 45,  
but fewer than 90 individual bags, folds, packages, envelopes, or containers of 
any kind containing fentanyl powder. Defines "fentanyl powder" as any compound, 
mixture or preparation, in granular or powder form, containing fentanyl.314 
 
(3) “Three Strikes” Reform Act:  
To remove the mandatory life sentence for a nonviolent, non-serious offense 
under the three strikes law.315 
 
(4) Drug Possession Reform Act:  
To reduce drug possession from a felony to a misdemeanor.316 
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(5) Trafficking Fentanyl in the First Degree Act:  
Prohibits trafficking of fentanyl. Provides that a person is guilty of trafficking 
in a controlled substance in the first degree when he or she knowingly and  
unlawfully traffics any quantity of heroin, fentanyl, carfentanil, or fentanyl  
derivatives. A first offense is a class C felony and a second offense is a class B  
felony. Requires an offer to serve at least 50% of their sentence.317  
 
(6) Aggravated Trafficking Misrepresented Fentanyl in the First Degree Act:  
Prohibits trafficking in a misrepresented controlled substances. Provides that 
a person is guilty of trafficking in a misrepresented controlled substances  
when he or she knowingly and unlawfully sells or distributes fentanyl,  
carfentanil, or any schedule I substance while misrepresenting the identity  
of the drug being sold or distributed as a legitimate pharmaceutical product, 
which is a Class D felony.318   
 
Law Enforcement Strategies 
 
As previously mentioned, the drug war era’s federalization of drug policy culminated in a 
major shift from community to military-style state and local policing.319 While this 
transformation carried adverse consequences, it is now clear that state and local police 
departments’ ability to actively participate in drug law enforcement can be utilized in a more 
effective way. In other words, instead of taking the hardline, “tough on crime” approach adopted 
by these state and local departments during the War on Drugs, they are now able to coordinate 
with both federal agencies and each other in a more inter-jurisdictional, community-based 
approach. Drug use and addiction is an important issue in many communities. These state and 
local law enforcement agencies now have the opportunity to respond directly to their citizenry 
and employ harm reduction-based policies and effective supply-reduction strategies, instead of 
following the crime control policy approach put forth on the federal level.   
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 One of the ways that states and localities, specifically counties, can institute these 
coordinated strategies is through the utilization of regional task forces. Regional task forces are 
necessary to achieve significant supply-reduction because drug trafficking often cuts across state 
and county lines. Furthermore, unless the drug crime was committed in more than one state, 
there is no guarantee that the federal agencies like the DEA or the FBI will become involved.  
These regional task forces allow for the creation of extensive data collection sharing networks 
and long-standing partnerships, which overall have resulted in better drug enforcement that can 
now specifically target heroin and fentanyl.320 For example, several counties that are adjacent to 
each other can form a “Drug Strike Force” through an inter-local agreement. This Drug Strike 
Force can allow the counties’ law enforcement agencies and community organizations to share 
intelligence with one another, conduct combined surveillance and undercover operations, and 
form long-term, cooperative investigations.321  Furthermore, the regional Drug Strike Force can 
provide both undercover narcotics and on-site training to police departments that need it.  
Another regional task force to consider is the Drug Market Intervention (DMI) strategy, 
which targets hot-spot drug markets by engaging directly in communities to identify street-level 
dealers, arrest violent offenders, and develop prosecutable drug cases for nonviolent dealers. 
This approach allows law enforcement to put dealers on notice that any future dealing will result 
in certain, immediate sanctions.322 DMI is a uniquely successful strategy, as it relies on the 
coordination between law enforcement, government officials, and the offenders themselves. 
Thus, this community-based, cooperative approach, along with regional Drug Strike Forces 
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should be taken into serious consideration by state and local law enforcement agencies that are 
trying to stem the supply of opioids in their jurisdictions.  
 
III. Ideal Demand-Side Recommendations 
 
A substantial amount of this thesis has been dedicated to identifying and analyzing the 
many factors that contribute to the opioid epidemic, which make finding policy solutions 
particularly challenging. In spite of this reality, there is one factor that may make implementing 
demand-side policies a little easier than it has been in previous epidemics: the growing 
recognition among the health care industry, medical field, policymakers, public health officials, 
law enforcement, and citizens that addiction is a chronic, treatable, medical disease. Of course, 
there is still stigmatization surrounding drug use, and there most likely always will be, especially 
for illicit drugs like heroin that are used intravenously. However, the significance of this shift in 
the national collective attitude regarding how people think about addiction is that demand-side 
policies have become increasingly included on the policy agendas on all three levels of 
government. Unlike earlier epidemics, the vast majority of people now believe that drug 
addiction can be treated, and also that it should be treated. With that being said, and taking into 
consideration the supply-side policies listed in the previous section of this chapter, it is now a 
prudent time to focus on the other side of the supply and demand framework: the addicted users 
that constitute the “demand” for opioids in this ongoing crisis.  
As discussed, demand-side policies refer to treatment, rehabilitation, and prevention 
strategies that lower the demand for drugs.323 More specifically, these demand-side solutions 
need to include a combination of both use reduction (which aims to decrease the volume of 
illicit-drug consumption) and harm reduction (which seeks to reduce the harmful consequences 
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associated with such use, even if policy measures don’t reduce overall use).324 In theory, 
demand-side policies could be implemented on the federal, state, or local levels. However, most 
of these strategies have been instituted on the lower levels of government, including those that 
are the most effective and successful. On the other hand, the national government’s most 
significant role has been, and should continue to be, providing more funding for these programs.  
Federal Level Demand-Side Policies 
 
 Theoretically speaking, the federal government could impose a wide array of demand-
side policies if it wanted to. Legally, federally-mandated demand-reduction strategies could be 
instituted because the national government has pre-emptive authority and funding capabilities 
that supersede state and local governments. For example, following a rise in rampant drug use 
and addiction in the 1990s, Portugal’s national government adopted the National Strategy for the 
Fight Against Drugs in 1999. This nation-wide strategy included a vast expansion of harm 
reduction efforts, and doubled the government’s investment in drug treatment and drug 
prevention services.325 Technically, the United States government could take a similar approach 
by implementing a homogeneous, national strategy geared towards harm and use reduction. 
However, this tactic has never been, and likely never will be, adopted by the United States 
because of the polarized political climate at the national level and the delegation of public health 
authority to states and localities. Although combating the opioid epidemic is one of the few 
issues that does garner bipartisan support, it is unlikely that the Republicans and Democrats 
could form a strategy that both sides agree on. Furthermore, considering the current presidential 
administration’s “tough on crime” rhetoric, it is also not likely that this will be achieved through 
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executive action. Therefore, demand-side solutions should be implemented on the state and local 
levels, while the federal government can provide monetary support for the programs.  
Expanded Funding 
Throughout the drug war era, the federal government gained a reputation for repeatedly 
appropriating more funding to agencies tasked with supply-side solutions, such as the DEA, FBI, 
and Department of Defense, as opposed to agencies that typically carry out demand-side 
strategies, such as the National Institute of Drug Abuse and Department of Education.326 
However, as demand-side solutions started to gain more legitimacy and political support, the 
federal government has begun to gradually dedicate more funding and grants toward these types 
of policies. For example, Trump’s recent omnibus bill added $3.3 billion to address the opioid 
crisis for fiscal year 2018. The allocations include $1.4 billion towards the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration ($1 billion for a new State Opioid Response Grant 
Program), and $350 million to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for opioid 
overdose prevention, surveillance, and state prescription drug monitoring programs. In addition, 
$415 million was allocated for the Health Resources and Services Administration to improve 
access to addiction treatment in rural and other underserved areas, and $100 million was targeted 
for the Administration for Children and Families to help children whose parents misuse drugs.327 
This funding is in addition to the $1 billion in grant funding awarded to states for opioid-related 
efforts in fiscal year 2018, approved by the 21st Century Cures Act.328                                                                                                                      
 This increase of funding for mainly demand-side, public health-based solutions is a step 
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in the right direction in terms of how the federal government should be appropriating funding for 
states and localities. However, some critics note that even this large commitment of money is not 
enough and is dwarfed compared to the funding for other types of diseases. For example, the 
annual budget for illnesses like HIV is $32 billion, almost ten times the amount that the 21st 
Cures Act and the omnibus bill combined provides for the opioid crisis.329 Especially because the 
opioid epidemic is a growing, ongoing crisis, there is a dire need for consistent, sustainable 
funding that will last past fiscal year 2018. Yet, the fact that Congress is now dedicated to 
providing money for mainly demand-side policies at all is a monumental achievement and 
should be expanded upon greatly, if possible, in the coming years.  
When considering the federal role in financially supporting state and local demand-side 
policies, the national government can be especially useful in providing funding for healthcare 
programs that offer treatment services for opioid addicts. As previously discussed at length in 
Chapter Three, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was a piece of landmark legislation because the 
Medicaid expansion provided millions of previously uninsured addicts with health insurance. 
Furthermore, it legally deemed addiction treatment as an “essential health benefit,” which added 
substance use disorder rehabilitation and services into mainstream healthcare coverage plans.330 
Most significantly, the ACA provided states that took the Medicaid expansion with enhanced 
federal funding. Subsequently, 40% of adults that suffer from an opioid addiction are now 
covered by Medicaid and can use their plans for treatment services.331 Despite the efforts of the 
current administration to repeal the ACA, it seems unlikely that this extremely beneficial 
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healthcare program will be altered any time soon, and should continue to be utilized in a way that 
helps addicts get the treatment they need.  
State Level Demand-Side Policies 
 
 Out of every policy recommendation mentioned thus far, demand-side solutions 
implemented on the state and local levels are perhaps the most important to take into 
consideration because they have the greatest ability to save human lives. This is emphasized by 
the fact that not only do states and localities carry most of the financial costs caused by the 
opioid crisis, but they also “shoulder the majority of the social burden.”332 Due to the structure of 
federalism, many national government officials, such as senators and congressman, do not come 
in contact with the actual reality of the destruction the opioid crisis has left in its wake. Because 
of their proximity to the communities they serve, officials and agents operating on the 
subnational levels are more likely to experience the human and societal damages the epidemic 
has caused. They are confronted in their offices by community groups advocating for change. 
They attend town meetings in which their constituents who have lost loved ones to overdoses 
tearfully plead for them to take action. State and local police, firefighters, EMTs, and other first 
responders witness multiple overdoses and overdose fatalities every day.  
Therefore, state and local governments, public health officials, law enforcement agencies, 
and first responders have the most knowledge of the core problems created by the opioid 
epidemic, and thus, are best situated to fix them. It is imperative to remember demand-side 
solutions implemented on the state and local levels are of the utmost necessity. No other type of 
                                                        
332 Lee C. Bollinger et al., “Ending the Opioid Crisis: A Practical Guide for State Policymakers,” The National 
Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, October 2017, https://www.centeronaddiction.org/newsroom. 
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policy at any other level of government has a greater ability to save some of the 115 lives that are 
currently being lost every single day due to a drug overdose.333  
State Budgets and Expanded Funding  
 
 Generally, in comparison with the federal government, state governments allocate more 
funding toward demand-side than supply-side policies. This is partly due to the fact that states 
“play a central role in protecting public health and safety; regulating health care providers; 
establishing prescription drug monitoring programs; and paying for care through Medicaid, state 
employee benefits, corrections, and other health programs.”334 Therefore, because they have 
direct authority over the policy areas that are related to, and affected by, demand-side solutions, 
they are better equipped to institute these types of policies. While some states are increasing their 
budgets and funding for demand-reduction strategies, this is not a viable option for economically 
depressed states. However, there are two other innovative approaches worth mentioning that 
have successfully gained more demand-side funding for financially strapped states.  
Following the national media revelation that pharmaceutical industries, such as Purdue 
Pharma, were largely responsible for igniting the prescription wave of the epidemic, several state 
Attorney Generals have filed lawsuits against these companies and have subsequently won 
extremely large settlements. One of these states is West Virginia, which decided to use the $24 
million from its settlement to expand the availability of treatment for people struggling with 
addiction.335 There are currently 41 attorneys with active investigations into these industries, and 
it is recommended that if they come away with any form of settlements, they should use at least 
                                                        
333 “Opioid Overdose Crisis,” National Institute on Drug Abuse, March 2018, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-
abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis. 
334 Murphy et al., “Finding Solutions to the Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Road Map for States.” 
335 Michael Virtanten, “West Virginia to Spend Opioid Lawsuit Funds on Addiction Treatment Facilities,” Insurance 
Journal, April 13, 2017, https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2017/04/13/447733.htm. 
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some portion of the money for demand-side strategies.336 Another creative policy is Ohio’s 
Opioid Technology Challenge, in which 44 organizations, including universities, hospitals, and 
pharmaceutical organizations, competed with each other to submit the best project proposal for 
solutions to the opioid epidemic. 337 While the results of this challenge have yet to be announced, 
the winner will be awarded grant funding to implement their proposal, which has the ability to 
yield some solutions that the state has not thought of yet. States that do not have adequate funds 
in their budgets for demand-reduction strategies should consider this type of policy. 
Diversion 
 
Diversion programs are important policies because they can deter individuals convicted 
of low-level drug offenses into community-based treatment and support services. A particularly 
successful diversion policy that has not been mentioned thus far is the creation of drug courts. As 
previously mentioned, one of the most adverse consequences of the punitive drug laws instituted 
during the War on Drugs era was that addicts were frequently sent to jail instead of treatment. 
Drug courts are a potential solution to this problem, as they operate as a court system separate 
from the criminal justice system. The main goal of these courts is to divert nonviolent offenders, 
many of whom were arrested for mere possession or intent to sell just to support their habit, into 
treatment programs instead of jail. Currently, all fifty states have working drug courts, totaling 
more than 2,4000 nationally.338 However, only one-third of nation-wide drug courts accept MAT 
                                                        
336 Yuki Noguchi, “State to Investigate Pharmaceutical Companies Over Opioids,” National Public Radio, 
September 19, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/19/552135830/41-states-to-investigate-
pharmaceutical-companies-over-opioids. 
337 Katie Zezima, “With Drug Overdoses Soaring, States Limit the Length of Painkiller Prescriptions,” The 
Washington Post, August 9, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-drug-overdoses-soaring-states-
limit-the-length-of-painkiller-prescriptions/2017/08/09/4d5d7e0c-7d0f-11e7-83c7-5bd5460f0d7e_story.html?utm_ 
term=.f1ac23950f7e. 
338 “Drug Courts,” U.S. Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs, May 2017, https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/238527.pdf.  
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for defendants.339 Furthermore, only 40% allow continuation of MAT for those who are already 
receiving treatment.340 The use of MAT is both feasible and successful in the treatment of opioid 
addiction, and thus it is important that the drug courts that do not accept MAT as a treatment 
option, or do not allow defendants to continue it, eliminate those restrictions. Another diversion 
program that localities should consider implementing is some form of a law enforcement assisted 
diversion program. LEAD programs function as a pre-booking system, in which addicts are 
referred to treatment instead of getting charged with a crime. Both drug courts and LEAD 
programs can be utilized to divert addicts, who otherwise may not have sought treatment, into 
detoxification and rehabilitation programs. 
Treatment, Harm Reduction, and Education  
 
 Examples of effective treatment, harm reduction, and education programs were all 
discussed at length in Chapter Four, and therefore, it is not necessary to go into great depth as to 
why states and localities should implement them.341 I will, however, underscore the importance 
of implementing such policies. The unfortunate truth is that in the United States, it is much easier 
to get high than it is to get help. Currently, only 12% of the 22.1 million addicts nation-wide are 
in treatment for their addictions, although most want to be.342 This is not only due to a lack of 
bed availability, but also because of the cost of treatment. In some cases, the cost of 
rehabilitation can be upwards of $50,000 – about the same for one year’s tuition at a private 
college.343 Furthermore, because addiction is a chronic illness, many addicts have to return back 
to treatment several times throughout their lives, driving up the costs even higher. The 
                                                        
339 Katel, “Opioid Crisis: Can Recent Reforms Curb the Epidemic.” 
340 Ibid.  
341 Refer back to Chapter 4, Section II for these examples.  
342 “Opioids,” Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, last updated February 23, 2016, 
https://www.samhsa.gov/atod/opioids. 
343 “Cost of Drug and Alcohol Rehab,” Addiction Center, N.d., https://www.addictioncenter.com/rehab-
questions/cost-of-drug-and-alcohol-treatment/. 
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implementation of a more affordable and efficient state treatment system, outlined below, can 
alleviate this pervasive issue. 
 Along with use-reduction strategies, such as treatment programs, harm reduction 
strategies are also extremely important for states and localities to implement for reducing the 
harms associated with opioid use for those unwilling, or more commonly unable, to get help.344 
Some of these strategies include syringe access programs, fentanyl test strip distribution, and 
Overdose Education Naloxone Distribution Programs (OENDs).  
 Last but certainly not least, education is key. Simply telling adolescents and other 
particularly vulnerable segments of the population to “just say no” to drugs is like trying to 
convince them that they are not getting wet in the middle of a rainstorm instead of giving them 
an umbrella. Educational and prevention initiatives delivered in school and community settings 
are particularly effective.345 On a wider scale, policy should mandate statewide public awareness 
campaigns that “educate the public, providers, state policymakers, and other public officials 
about the risks associated with opioids, the scope of the problem, and the need to destigmatize 
and raise awareness about treatment and recovery.”346 Prohibition and “just say no” campaigns 
have repeatedly fallen flat, and it is now time for states and localities to take a more practical, 
honest approach about educating their citizens about drug use. In conclusion, outlined below are 
a few model laws derived from the successful programs and legislation mentioned in Chapter 
Four that can guide states in their efforts to address the opioid epidemic. Please refer back to the 
individual examples in the previous chapter for explanations as to why these laws are necessary 
for states to implement in order to successfully diminish the demand for opioids.  
                                                        
344 Refer back to Chapter 4, Section II for explanations as to why these strategies are effective harm-reduction 
strategies.  
345 Compton, 3. 
346 Murphy et al., “Finding Solutions to the Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Road Map for States”. 
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Proposed Model State Laws  
 
(1) Opioid Addiction “Hub and Spoke” Treatment Program Act:  
 
A. This act authorizes a regional system of opioid treatment called the Care Alliance for 
Opioid Treatment, also known as the Hub and Spoke system. 
 
1. Each center, or hub, will serve a defined geographic area and provide 
comprehensive addictions and co-occurring mental health treatment services to 
Vermonters with opioid addiction. In addition, these specialized centers will 
assure the provision of integrated health care, recovery supports, and 
rehabilitation services for clients of the centers. Each center will provide 
specialized Medication Assisted Therapy (MAT) for clients in combination with 
counseling and other services to provide a whole-person approach to the treatment 
of substance abuse disorders. 
 
2. Less clinically complex patients who require MAT but not methadone will 
receive treatment within the Spoke system. Spoke entities may be primary care 
medical homes, Federally Qualified Health Centers, independent physicians (and 
psychiatrists), or specialty clinic-based outpatient substance abuse treatment 
providers, all with augmented counseling, health promotion, and care 
coordination services.347  
 
(2) Prescriber Immunity for Treatment or Prevention of a Drug Overdose with Opioid Antagonist 
Act: 
 
A licensed health care professional who is permitted by law to prescribe an 
opioid antagonist may, if acting with reasonable care, prescribe, dispense,  
or administer an opioid antagonist to treat or prevent a drug overdose without 
being liable for damages in a civil action or subject to criminal prosecution for 
prescribing, dispensing or administering such opioid antagonist or for any  
subsequent use of such opioid antagonist. For purposes of this section, “opioid 
antagonist” means naloxone hydrochloride or any other similarly acting and  
equally safe drug approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration for  
the treatment of drug overdose.348  
 
 (3) Pharmacist Immunity for Opioid Antagonist Possession and Administration Act:  
A licensed pharmacist may dispense, furnish, or otherwise provide an opioid  
antagonist in the name of a service program, law enforcement agency, or fire  
department, without a patient-specific prescription from another medical  
professional.349  
                                                        
347 “The Opioid Addiction Treatment System: Report to the Vermont Legislature,” Vermont Department of Health, 
January 15, 2013, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/2013ExternalReports/285154.pdf. 
348 CT Gen Stat § 17a-714a (2012). 
349 IA Code § 147A (2018).  
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 (4) Layperson Release from Liability to Administer Opioid Antagonists Act:  
A. A Person authorized under federal, state, or local government regulations, 
other than a licensed health care professional permitted by law to administer  
an opioid antagonist to another person if: 
 
1. He, in good faith, believes the other person is experiencing a drug overdose; 
    and 
 
2. He acts with reasonable care in administering the drug to the other person 
 
B. A person who administers an opioid antagonist to another person pursuant 
to Subsection A of this section shall not be subject to civil liability or criminal 
prosecution as a result of the administration of the drug.350  
 
(5) Criminal Immunity for Persons who Suffer or Report an Alcohol or Drug Overdose or Other 
Life Threatening Medical Emergency Act:  
 
A. A person who is experiencing an overdose or other life-threatening medical 
emergency and anyone (including the person experiencing the emergency) seeking 
medical attention for that person shall not be arrested, charged, or prosecuted for an 
offense for which they have been granted immunity pursuant to subsection (B.) of this 
section, or subject to the revocation or modification of the conditions of probation, if: 
 
1. The person seeking medical attention reports in good faith the emergency to 
law enforcement, the 9-1-1 system, a poison control center, or to a medical 
provider, or if the person in good faith assists someone so reporting; and 
 
2. The person provides all relevant medical information as to the cause of the 
overdose or other life-threatening medical emergency that the person possesses at 
the scene of the event when a medical provider arrives, or when the person is at 
the facilities of the medical provider.   
 
B. The immunity shall apply to all offenses that are not class A, B, or C felonies, 
including but limited to the following offenses: 
  
 1. Miscellaneous drug crimes; 
 
 2. Illegal possession and delivery of non-controlled prescription drugs; 
 
 3. Possession of controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances; 
 
 4. Possession of drug paraphernalia; 
 
                                                        
350 NM Stat § 24-23-1 (1996).  
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 5. Possession of marijuana.351  
 
(6) Prescription Drug Monitoring Program “Must Access” Act: 
 
A. All prescribers in possession of a State Controlled Substance Registration 
issued by the State, Department of Consumer Protection, will be required to 
register as a user with the State Prescription Monitoring and Reporting System 
(PMRS). 
 
B. Prior to prescribing greater than a 72-hour supply of any controlled substance 
(Schedule II - V) to any patient, the prescribing practitioner or such practitioner's 
authorized agent shall review the patient's records in the CPMRS at the PMRS Data 
Collection website.352  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
351 2 DE Code § 4769 (2014).  
352 CT Public Act § 15-198 (2015). 
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Conclusion: Realistic Expectations 
 
“A danger or an opportunity.”  
 
-- Chinese definition of a crisis 
 
As this thesis has demonstrated, there is no shortage of possible policy solutions for 
combatting the opioid epidemic that can be implemented on the federal, state, and local levels of 
government. Successful and practical supply-side and demand-side solutions have already been 
employed to some extent, and it is likely that additional cooperation and coordination between 
jurisdictions can increase the effectiveness of these policies. However, at the heart of this crisis 
lies a fundamental question: is this a battle that the United States wants to fight? 
It is no secret that in regards to the opioid epidemic, the current president is causing more 
political polarization and confusion on the federal level than previous administrations. While 
Trump has promised to be dedicated in his fight against the crisis, it does not seem likely that the 
policy recommendations I proposed on the federal level, which would allocate more funding and 
resources to demand-side policies, will come to fruition. There is an overall trend of support for 
both supply-side and demand-side solutions among state and local governments, several federal 
entities, and most drug policy experts. However, Trump seems to be solely relying on his 
inexperienced, and in some cases unqualified, opioid cabinet and continues to revert back to a 
“tough on crime” approach that is known to be largely ineffective. While he may institute some 
of my supply-side recommendations, such as increased source country control and interdiction 
protocols, it is difficult to decipher whether he will seriously consider allocating more funding to 
states and localities for their own demand-side solutions.  
While this may seem disheartening, a silver lining can be found in the fact that 
presidential administrations change. Remarkably, the opioid epidemic is one of the few national 
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issues that garners bipartisan support, and it is possible that a future administration that offers a 
more comprehensive and logical approach to drug policy can persuade the Republicans and 
Democrats to compromise on allocating more demand-side funding to states and localities. 
Moreover, despite the “tough on crime” rhetoric championed by the executive branch, attitudes 
surrounding drug abuse and addiction are changing. Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
following a shift in power, more legislation like CARA and the 21st Century Cures Act will have 
a chance to pass in Congress.  
In the meantime, states and localities have, and will continue to combat the crisis on the 
ground level every single day. As I have discussed at length, in the face of federal inaction, many 
subnational jurisdictions have implemented their own innovative policy responses for the opioid 
epidemic. While the federalization of drug policy may have caused issues during the War on 
Drugs era, federalism is now utilized in a particularly effective way by states and localities. 
However, it is crucial to remember that there needs to be some form of coordination between 
states and localities and the federal level in order to optimize the efficacy of these policies and 
mitigate the epidemic more quickly. Optimistically, this aspiration will become reality in the 
near future. 
Lastly, it is necessary to underscore the importance of ongoing research and evaluation 
into the opioid crisis, and drug epidemics in general. The more research, studies, and resources 
that can be produced and subsequently circulated throughout the academic world, governments, 
and communities, the better chance policymakers will have to institute the newest and most 
effective strategies. Moreover, as America’s history tells us, it is nearly impossible to prevent 
drug epidemics from taking root in our society. Therefore, it is critical that evidence based 
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research which focuses on ways to alleviate these crises continues. The work will never be 
finished.  
A crisis can be considered either as a danger or an opportunity. While the opioid crisis is 
of course a danger to addicts and society as a whole, it does not have to be. The United States has 
both the ability and opportunity to change how it addresses drug epidemics. These policies are 
how we can start. This epidemic can provide us with the realization that we, as a nation, have the 
capability and the willingness to respond to addiction epidemics and formulate lasting and 
equitable solutions that can improve the health, safety, and quality of life of all American 
citizens. During the time it took to read this thesis – roughly two hours – ten Americans have 
died due to an opioid drug overdose. It is my greatest hope that through the successful 
implementation of these policies, this number will significantly decrease.  
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Appendix 
 
Federal Supply-Side Laws: 
(1) Elimination of Mandatory Minimum Reform Act: 
To eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for all drug offenses. 
(2) Drug Possession Reform Act:  
To reduce drug possession from a felony to a misdemeanor.” 
(3) Illicit Fentanyl Analogue Scheduling Act: 
Makes any illicit fentanyl analogue a Schedule II drug. Provides that anyone 
who possess, imports, distributes, or manufactures any illicit fentanyl 
analogue will be subject to criminal prosecution in the same manner as for 
fentanyl and other controlled substances. 
 
State Supply-Side Laws: 
 
(1) Elimination of Mandatory Minimum Reform Act: 
To eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for all drug offenses. 
(2) Fentanyl Trafficking Act:  
Makes it a trafficking offense to possess 2 or more grams of fentanyl powder or 
90 or more individual bags, folds, packages, envelopes, or containers of any kind 
containing fentanyl powder. Makes it an offense to “furnish” controlled 
substances by possession of 2 grams or more of fentanyl powder or at least 45,  
but fewer than 90 individual bags, folds, packages, envelopes, or containers of 
any kind containing fentanyl powder. Defines "fentanyl powder" as any compound, 
mixture or preparation, in granular or powder form, containing fentanyl. 
 
(3) “Three Strikes” Reform Act:  
To remove the mandatory life sentence for a nonviolent, non-serious offense 
under the three strikes law. 
 
(4) Drug Possession Reform Act:  
To reduce drug possession from a felony to a misdemeanor 
(5) Trafficking Fentanyl in the First Degree Act:  
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Prohibits trafficking of fentanyl. Provides that a person is guilty of trafficking 
in a controlled substance in the first degree when he or she knowingly and  
unlawfully traffics any quantity of heroin, fentanyl, carfentanil, or fentanyl  
derivatives. A first offense is a class C felony and a second offense is a class B  
felony. Requires an offer to serve at least 50% of their sentence. 
 
(6) Aggravated Trafficking Misrepresented Fentanyl in the First Degree Act:  
Prohibits trafficking in a misrepresented controlled substances. Provides that 
a person is guilty of trafficking in a misrepresented controlled substances  
when he or she knowingly and unlawfully sells or distributes fentanyl,  
carfentanil, or any schedule I substance while misrepresenting the identity  
of the drug being sold or distributed as a legitimate pharmaceutical product, 
which is a Class D felony. 
 
State Demand-Side Laws: 
 
(1) Opioid Addiction “Hub and Spoke” Treatment Program Act:  
 
A. This act authorizes a regional system of opioid treatment called the Care Alliance for 
Opioid Treatment, also known as the Hub and Spoke system. 
 
1. Each center, or hub, will serve a defined geographic area and provide 
comprehensive addictions and co-occurring mental health treatment services to 
Vermonters with opioid addiction. In addition, these specialized centers will 
assure the provision of integrated health care, recovery supports, and 
rehabilitation services for clients of the centers. Each center will provide 
specialized Medication Assisted Therapy (MAT) for clients in combination with 
counseling and other services to provide a whole-person approach to the treatment 
of substance abuse disorders. 
 
2. Less clinically complex patients who require MAT but not methadone will 
receive treatment within the Spoke system. Spoke entities may be primary care 
medical homes, Federally Qualified Health Centers, independent physicians (and 
psychiatrists), or specialty clinic-based outpatient substance abuse treatment 
providers, all with augmented counseling, health promotion, and care 
coordination services. 
 
(2) Prescriber Immunity for Treatment or Prevention of a Drug Overdose with Opioid Antagonist 
Act: 
 
A licensed health care professional who is permitted by law to prescribe an 
opioid antagonist may, if acting with reasonable care, prescribe, dispense,  
or administer an opioid antagonist to treat or prevent a drug overdose without 
being liable for damages in a civil action or subject to criminal prosecution for 
prescribing, dispensing or administering such opioid antagonist or for any  
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subsequent use of such opioid antagonist. For purposes of this section, “opioid 
antagonist” means naloxone hydrochloride or any other similarly acting and  
equally safe drug approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration for  
the treatment of drug overdose. 
 
 (3) Pharmacist Immunity for Opioid Antagonist Possession and Administration Act:  
A licensed pharmacist may dispense, furnish, or otherwise provide an opioid  
antagonist in the name of a service program, law enforcement agency, or fire  
department, without a patient-specific prescription from another medical  
professional. 
 
 (4) Layperson Release from Liability to Administer Opioid Antagonists Act:  
A. A Person authorized under federal, state, or local government regulations, 
other than a licensed health care professional permitted by law to administer  
an opioid antagonist to another person if: 
 
1. He, in good faith, believes the other person is experiencing a drug overdose; 
    and 
 
2. He acts with reasonable care in administering the drug to the other person 
 
B. A person who administers an opioid antagonist to another person pursuant 
to Subsection A of this section shall not be subject to civil liability or criminal 
prosecution as a result of the administration of the drug. 
 
(5) Criminal Immunity for Persons who Suffer or Report an Alcohol or Drug Overdose or Other 
Life Threatening Medical Emergency Act:  
 
A. A person who is experiencing an overdose or other life-threatening medical 
emergency and anyone (including the person experiencing the emergency) seeking 
medical attention for that person shall not be arrested, charged, or prosecuted for an 
offense for which they have been granted immunity pursuant to subsection (B.) of this 
section, or subject to the revocation or modification of the conditions of probation, if: 
 
1. The person seeking medical attention reports in good faith the emergency to 
law enforcement, the 9-1-1 system, a poison control center, or to a medical 
provider, or if the person in good faith assists someone so reporting; and 
 
2. The person provides all relevant medical information as to the cause of the 
overdose or other life-threatening medical emergency that the person possesses at 
the scene of the event when a medical provider arrives, or when the person is at 
the facilities of the medical provider.   
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B. The immunity shall apply to all offenses that are not class A, B, or C felonies, 
including but limited to the following offenses: 
  
 1. Miscellaneous drug crimes; 
 
 2. Illegal possession and delivery of non-controlled prescription drugs; 
 
 3. Possession of controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances; 
 
 4. Possession of drug paraphernalia; 
 
 5. Possession of marijuana. 
 
(6) Prescription Drug Monitoring Program “Must Access” Act: 
 
A. All prescribers in possession of a State Controlled Substance Registration 
issued by the State, Department of Consumer Protection, will be required to 
register as a user with the State Prescription Monitoring and Reporting System 
(PMRS). 
 
B. Prior to prescribing greater than a 72-hour supply of any controlled substance 
(Schedule II - V) to any patient, the prescribing practitioner or such practitioner's 
authorized agent shall review the patient's records in the CPMRS at the PMRS Data 
Collection website. 
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